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7. DEVELOPMENTAL PARADIGMS *
7.1 Introduction.
Consider the real line. If you believe that time is the ordinary continuum,
then the entire real line can be your time line. Otherwise, you may consider only
a subset of the real line as a time line. In the original version of this section, the
time concept for the MA-model was presented in a unnecessarily complex form. As
shown in [3], one can assume an absolute substratum time within the NSP-world.
It is the infinitesimal light-clock time measures that may be altered by physical
processes. In my view, the theory of quantum electrodynamics would not exist
without such a NSP-world time concept.
Consider a small interval [a, b), a < b as our basic time interval where as the real
numbers increase the time is intuitively considered to be increasing. In the following
approach, one may apply the concept of the persistence of mental version relative to
descriptions for the behavior of a Natural (i.e. physical) system at a moment of time
within this interval. An exceptionally small subinterval can be chosen within [a, b)
as a maximum subinterval length =M. “Time” and the size of a “time” interval as
they are used in this and the following sections refer to an intuitive concept used
to aid in comprehending the notation of an event sequence. [See below.] First, let
a = t0. Then choose t1 such that a < t1 < b. There is a partition t1, . . . , tm of [a, b)
such that t0 < t1 < · · · < tm < b and tj+1 − tj ≤M. The final subinterval [tm, b) is
now separated, by induction, say be taking midpoints, into an increasing sequence
of times {tq} such that tm < tq < b for each q and limq→∞ tq = b.
Assume the prototype [a, b) with the time subintervals as defined above. Let
[tj , tj+1) be any of the time subintervals in [a, b). For each such subinterval, let Wi
denote the readable sentence
This|||frozen|||segment|||gives|||a|||description|||for|||the|||
time|||interval|||that|||has|||as|||its|||leftmost|||endpoint|||the
|||time|||⌈ti⌉|||that|||corresponds|||to|||the|||natural|||number|||i.
Let Ti = {xWi | x ∈ W}. The set Ti is called a totality and each member of
any such Ti is called a frozen segment. Notice that since the empty word is not a
member of W , then the cardinality of each member of Ti is greater than that of
Wi. Each Ti is a (Dedekind) denumerable set, and if i 6= j, then Ti ∩ Tj = ∅.
It is obvious that the concept of “time” need not be the underlying interpreta-
tion for these intervals. Time simply refers to an external event ordering concept.
For other purposes, simply call these intervals “event intervals.” In the above de-
scriptions for Wi, simply replace “time|||interval” with “event|||interval” and replace
the second instance of the word “time” with the word “event.” If this interpretation
is made, then other compatible interpretations would be necessary when applying
a few of the following results.
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I point out two minor aspects of the above constructions. First,5within certain
descriptions there are often “symbols” used for real, complex, natural numbers etc.
These objects also exist as abstract objects within the structureM. No inconsistent
interpretations should occur when these objects are specifically modeled within M
since to my knowledge all of the usual mathematical objects used within physical
analysis are disjoint from E as well as disjoint from any finite Cartesian product of E
with itself. If for future research within physical applications finite partial sequences
of natural numbers and the finite equivalence classes that appear in E are needed and
are combined into one model for different purposes than the study of descriptions,
then certain modifications would need to be made so that interpretations would
remain consistent. Secondly, I have tried whenever intuitive strings are used or sets
of such strings are defined to use Roman letter notation for such objects. This only
applies for the intuitive model. Also Wi is only an identifier and may be altered.
7.2 Developmental Paradigms
It is clear that if one considers a time interval of the type (−∞,+∞), (−∞, b)
or [a,+∞), then each of these may be considered as the union of a denumerable
collection of time intervals of the type [a, b) with common endpoint names displayed.
Further, although [a, b) is to be considered as subdivided into denumerably many
subintervals, it is not necessary that each of the time intervals [tj , tj+1) ⊂ [a, b)
be accorded a corresponding description for the appearance of a specific Natural
system that is distinct from all others that occur throughout the time subinterval.
Repeated descriptions only containing a different last natural number i in the next
to last position will suffice. Each basic developmental paradigm will be restricted,
at present, to such a time interval [a, b).
Where human perception and descriptive ability is concerned, the least con-
troversial approach would be to consider only finitely many descriptive choices as
appropriate. A finite set is recursive and such a choice, since the result is such a
set, would be considered to be the simplest type of algorithm. You “simply” check
to see if an expression is a member of such a finite set. If we limited ourselves
to finitely many human choices for Natural system descriptions from the set of all
totalities and did not allow a denumerable or a continuum set to be chosen, then
the next result establishes that within the Nonstandard Physical world (i.e. NSP-
world) such a finite-type of choice can be applied and a continuum of descriptions
obtained.
The following theorem is not insignificant even if we are willing to accept a
denumerable set of distinct descriptions — descriptions that are not only distinct
in the next to the last symbol, but are also distinctly different in other aspects as
well. For, if this is the case, the results of Theorem 7.2.1 still apply. The same
finite-type of process in the NSP-world yields such a denumerable set as well.
The term “NSP-world” will signify a certain second type of interpretation for
nonstandard entities. In particular, the subtle logics, unreadable sentences, etc.
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This interpretation will be developed throughout the remainder of this book. One
important aspect of how descriptions are to be interpreted is that a description cor-
relates directly to an assumed or observed real Natural phenomenon, and conversely.
In these investigations, the phenomenon is called an event.
In order to simplify matters a bit, the following notation is employed. Let
T = {Ti | i ∈ IN}. Let F (T ) be the set of all nonempty and finite subsets of
T . This symbol has been used previously to include the empty set, this set is now
excluded. Now let A ∈ F (T ). Then there exists a finite choice set s such that
x ∈ s iff there exists a unique Ti ∈ A and x ∈ Ti. Now let the set C denote the
set of all such finite choice sets. As to interpreting these results within the NSP-
world, the following is essential. Within nonstandard analysis the term “hyper” is
often used for the result of the * map. For example, you have ∗IR as the hyperreals
since IR is termed the real numbers. For certain, but not all concepts, the term
“hyper” or the corresponding * notation will be universally replaced by the term
“ultra.” Thus, certain purely subtle words or *-words become “ultrawords” within
the developmental paradigm interpretation. [Note: such a word was previously
called a superword.] Of course, for other scientific or philosophical systems, such
abstract mathematical objects can be reinterpreted by an appropriate technical
term taken from those disciplines.
As usual, we are working within any enlargement and all of the above intuitive
objects are embedded into the G-structure. Recall, that to simplify expressions, we
often suppress within our first-order statements a specific superstructure element
that bounds a specific quantifier. The alphabet A is now assumed to be countable.
[Note 2 MAY 1998: The material between the [[ and the ]] has been altered
from the original that appeared in the 1993 revision.] [[[Although theorem 7.2.1
may be significant, it is no longer used for the other portions of this research. The
set of all developmental paradigms corresponds to the set of all choice functions
define on T . Also see http://arxiv.org/abs/math/0605120
Theorem 7.2.1 Let ∅ 6= ζ ⊂ IN and T˜ = {Ti | i ∈ ζ}. There exists a set of
sets S determined by hyperfinite set Q and hyper finite choice defined on Q such
that:
(i ) s′ ∈ S iff for each T ∈ T˜ there is one and only one [g] ∈ ∗T such that
[g] ∈ s′, and if x ∈ s′, then there is some T ∈ T˜ and some [g] ∈ ∗T such that
x = [g]. (If ∗ [g] ∈ σT, then [g] = [f ] ∈ T.)
Proof. (i) Let A ∈ F (T˜ ). Then from the definition of T˜ , there exists some
n ∈ IN such that A = {Tji | i = 0, . . . , n ∧ ji ∈ IN}. From the definition of Tk,
each Tk is denumerable. Notice that any [f ] ∈ Tk is associated with a unique
member of A1.. Simply consider the unique f0 ∈ [f ]. The unique member of A1 is
by definition f0(0). Thus each member of Tk can be specifically identified. Hence,
for each Ti there is a denumerable Mi ⊂ IN and a bijection hi:Mi → Ti such that
ai ∈ Ti iff there is a ki ∈ Mi and hi(ki) = ai. Consequently, for each i = 0, . . . , n
and aji ∈ Tji , we have that hji(kji ) = aji , and conversely for each i = 0, . . . , n and
kji ∈ Mji , hji(kji) ∈ Tji . Obviously, {hji(kji) | i = 0, . . . , n} is a finite choice set.
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All of the above may be translated into the following sentence that holds in M.
(Note: Choice sets are usually considered as the range of choice functions. Further,
“bounded formula simplification” has been used.)
∀y(y ∈ F (T˜ )→ ∃s((s ∈ P(E)) ∧ ∀x((x ∈ y)→ ∃z((z ∈ x) ∧ (z ∈ s)∧
∀w(w ∈ E → ((w ∈ s) ∧ (w ∈ x)↔ (w = z)))))∧
(7.2.1) ∀u(u ∈ E → ((u ∈ s)↔ ∃x1((x1 ∈ y) ∧ (u ∈ x1))))))
For each A ∈ F (T˜ ), let SA be the set of all such choice sets generated by the
predicate that follows the first→ formed from (7.2.1) by deleting the ∃s and letting
y = A. Of course, this set exists within our set theory. Now let C = {SA | A ∈
F (T˜ )}.
Consider ∗C and ∗(SA). Then s ∈ ∗(SA) iff s satisfies (7.2.1) as interpreted in
∗M. Since we are working in an enlargement, there exists an internal Q ∈ ∗(F (T˜ ))
such that σT˜ ⊂ Q ⊂ ∗ T˜ . Recall that σT˜ = { ∗T | T ∈ T˜ }. Also σT ⊂ ∗T for
each T ∈ T˜ . From the definition of ∗C, there is an internal set SQ and s ∈ SQ iff s
satisfies the internal defining predicate for members of SQ and this set is the set of
all such s. (⇒) Consequently, since for each T ∈ T˜ , ∗T ∈ Q, then the generally
external s′ = {s ∩ ∗T | T ∈ T˜ } satisfies the ⇒ for (i). Note, however, that for
∗T, T ∈ T˜ , it is possible that s ∩ ∗T = { ∗ [f ]} and ∗ [f ] ∈ σT. In this case, by
the finiteness of [f ] it follows that [f ] = ∗ [f ] implies that s ∩ ∗T = {[f ]}. Now let
S = {s′ | s ∈ SQ}. In general, S is an external object.
(⇐) Consider the internal set SQ. Let s′ be the set as defined by the right-hand
side of (i). For each internal x ∈ s′ and applying, if necessary, the *-axiom of choice
for *-finite sets, we have the internal set Ax = {y | (y ∈ SQ)∧ (x ∈ y)} is nonempty.
The set {Ax | x ∈ s′} has the finite intersection property. For, let nonempty internal
B = {x1, . . . , xn}. Then the set AB = {y | (y ∈ SQ) ∧ (x1 ∈ y) · · · ∧ (xn ∈ y)} is
internal and nonempty by the *-axiom of choice for *-finite sets. Since we are in
an enlargement and s′ is countable, then D =
⋂
{Ax | x ∈ s′} 6= ∅. Now take any
s ∈ D. Then s ∈ SQ and from the definition of S, s′ ∈ S. This completes the
proof.
[Note: Theorem 7.2.1 may be used to model physical developmental paradigms
associated with event sequences.]
Although it is not necessary, for this particular investigation, the set S may
be considered a set of all developmental paradigms. Apparently, S contains every
possible developmental paradigm for all possible frozen segments and S contains
paradigms for any *-totality ∗T. There are *-frozen segments contained in various
s′ that can be assumed to be unreadable sentences since σT 6= ∗T.]]
Let A ∈ F (T˜ ) and M(A) be a subset of SA for which there exists a written set
of rules that selects some specific member of SA. Obviously, this may be modeled by
means of functional relations. First, M(A) ⊂ SA and it follows, from the difference
in cardinalities, that there are infinitely many members of ∗(SA) for which there
does not exist a readable rule that will select such members. However, this does
not preclude the possibility that there is a set of purely unreadable sentences that
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do determine a specific member of ∗SA − σM(A). This might come about in the
following manner. Suppose that H is an infinite set of formal sentences that is
interpreted to be a set of rules for the selection of distinct members of M(A).
Suppose we have a bijection h:M(A)→ H that represents this selection process. Let
∗M be at least a polysaturated enlargement of M, and consider σf : σ(M(A)) →
σH. The map σf is also a bijection and σf : σ(M(A)) → ∗H. Since |σ(M(A))| <
|M|, it is well-known that there exists an internal map h:A′ → ∗H such that
h | σ(M(A)) = σf, and A′, h[A′] are internal. Further, for internal A′ ∩ ∗(SA) =
B, σ(M(A)) ⊂ B. However, σ(M(A)) is external. This yields that h is defined on
B and B ∩ ( ∗SA − σ(M(A))) 6= ∅. Also, σH ⊂ h[B] ⊂ ∗H implies, since h[B] is
internal, that σH 6= h[B]. Consequently, in this case, h[B] may be interpreted as
a set of *-rules that determine the selection of members of B. That is to say that
there is some [g] ∈ h[B]− σH and a [k] ∈ ∗SA − σ(M(A)) such that ([k], [g]) ∈ h.
As it will be shown in the next section, the set H can be so constructed that if
[g] ∈ h[B]− σH, then [g] is unreadable.
7.3 Ultrawords
Ordinary propositional logic is not compatible with deductive quantum logic,
intuitionistic logic, among others. In this section, a subsystem of propositional logic
is investigated which rectifies this incompatibility. I remark that when a standard
propositional language L or an informal language P isomorphic to L is considered,
it will always be the case that the L or P is minimal relative to its applications.
This signifies that if L or P is employed in our investigation for a developmental
paradigm, then L or P is constructed only from those distinct propositional atoms
that correspond to distinct members of d, etc. The same minimizing process is
always assumed for the following constructions.
Let B be a formal or, informal nonempty set of propositions. Construct the
language P0 in the usual manner from B (with superfluous parentheses removed)
so that P0 forms the smallest set of formulas that contains B and such that P0 is
closed under the two binary operations ∧ and → as they are formally or informally
expressed. Of course, this language may be constructed inductively or by letting
P0 be the intersection of all collections of such formula closed under ∧ and → .
We now define the deductive system S. Assume substitutivity, parenthesis re-
duction and the like. Let d = {Fi | i ∈ IN} = B be a development paradigm, where
each Fi is a readable frozen segment and describes the behavior of a Natural system
over a time subinterval. Let the set of axioms be the schemata
(1) (A ∧ B)→ A, A ∈ B
(2) (A ∧ B)→ B
(3) A ∧ (B ∧ C)→ (A ∧ B) ∧ C,
(4) (A ∧ B) ∧ C → A ∧ (B ∧ C).
If P0 is considered as informal, which appears to be necessary for some
applications, where the parentheses are replaced by the concept of symbol strings
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being to the “left” or “right” of other symbol strings and the concept of strengths
of connectives is used (i.e. A∧B→ C means ((A∧B)→ C), then axioms 3 — 4 and
the parentheses in (1) and (2) may be omitted. The one rule of inference is Modus
Ponens (MP). Proofs or demonstrations from hypotheses Γ contain finitely many
steps, hypotheses may be inserted as steps and the last step in the proof is either
a theorem if Γ = ∅ or if Γ 6= ∅, then the last step is a consequence of ( a deduction
from ) Γ. Notice that repeated application of (4) along with (MP) will allow all
left parentheses to be shifted to the right with the exception of the (suppressed)
outermost left one. Thus this leads to the concept of left to right ordering of a
formula. This allows for the suppression of such parentheses. In all the following,
this suppression will be done and replaced with formula left to right ordering.
For each Γ ⊂ P0, let S(Γ) denote the set of all formal theorems and con-
sequences obtained from the above defined system S. Since hypotheses may be
inserted, for each Γ ⊂ P0, Γ ⊂ S(Γ) ⊂ P0. This implies that S(Γ) ⊂ S(S(Γ)). So,
let A ∈ S(S(Γ)). The general concept of combining together finitely many steps
from various proofs to yield another formal proof leads to the result that A ∈ S(Γ).
Therefore, S(Γ) = S(S(Γ)). Finally, the finite step requirement also yields the result
that if A ∈ S(Γ), then there exists a finite F ⊂ Γ such that A ∈ S(F). Consequently,
S is a finitary consequence operator and observe that if C is the propositional con-
sequence operator, then S(Γ)⊂6=C(Γ). Of course, we may now apply the nonstandard
theory of consequence operators to S.
It is well-known that the axiom schemata chosen for S are theorems in in-
tuitionistic logic. Now consider quantum logic with the Mittelstaedt conditional
i1(A,B) = A
⊥∨(A∧B). [1] Notice that i1(A∧B,B) = (A∧B)⊥∨((A∧B)∧B) = (A∧
B)⊥∨(A∧B) = I ( the upper unit.) Then i1(A∧B),A) = (A∧B)⊥∨((A∧B)∧A) =
(A∧B)⊥∨(A∧B) = I; i1((A∧B)∧C),A∧(B∧C)) = ((A∧B)∧C)⊥∨(A∧(B∧C)) =
I = i1(A∧ (B∧C), (A∧B)∧C). Thus with respect to the interpretation of A → B
as conditional i1 the axiom schemata for the system S are theorems and the system
S is compatible with deductive quantum logic under the Mittelstaedt conditional.
Recall that d = {Fi | i ∈ IN} is a development paradigm, where each Fi is a
readable frozen segment, and describes the behavior of a Natural system at each
moment of a time interval. For the next construction a formal language that is,
of course, isomorphic to the informal language is employed. Each ∧ [resp. Fi]
corresponds to a specific |||and||| [resp. a propositional atom that corresponds to
a specific word] when embedded. This eliminates confusion, when |||and||| appears
in the Fi. Let M0 = d. Define M1 = {F0|||and|||F1}. Assume that Mn is defined.
Define Mn+1 = {x|||and|||Fn+1 | x ∈ Mn}. From the fact that d is a developmental
paradigm, where the last two symbols in each member of d is the time indicator
“i.”, it follows that no member of d is a member of Mn for n > 0. Now let Md =⋃
{Mn | n ∈ IN}. Intuitively, |||and||| behaves as a conjunction and each Fi as an
atom within our language. Notice the important formal demonstration fact that
for an hypothesis consisting of any member of Mn, n > 0, repeated applications of
(1), (MP), (2), (MP) will lead to the members of d appearing in the proper time
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ordering at increasing (formal) demonstration step numbers.
Theorem 7.3.1 For d = {Fi | i ∈ IN}, there exists an ultrawordw ∈ ∗Md− ∗d
such that Fi ∈ ∗S({w}) (i.e. w ∗⊢SFi) for each i ∈ IN.
Proof. Consider the binary relation G = {(x, y) | (x ∈ d)∧(y ∈Md − d)∧(x ∈
S({y})}. Suppose that {(x1, y1), . . . (xn, yn)} ⊂ G. For each i = 1, . . . , n there is a
unique ki ∈ IN such that xi = Fki . Let m = max{ki | (xi = Fki) ∧ (i = 1, . . . , n)}.
Let b ∈ Mm+1. It follows immediately that xi ∈ S({b}) for each i = 1, . . . , n and,
from the construction of d, b /∈ d. Thus {(x1, b), . . . , (xn, b)} ⊂ G. Consequently,
G is a concurrent relation. Hence, there exists some w ∈ ∗Md − ∗d such that
σFi = Fi ∈ ∗S({w}) for each i ∈ IN. This completes the proof. [See note 4.]
Observe that w in Theorem 7.3.1 has all of the formally expressible properties of
a readable word. For example, w has a hyperfinite length, among other properties.
However, since d is a denumerable set, each ultraword has a very special property.
Recall that for each [g] ∈ E there exists a unique m ∈ IN and f ′ ∈ Tm such
that [f ′] = [g] and for each k such that m < k ∈ IN, there does not exist g′ ∈ T k
such that [g′] = [g]. The function f ′ ∈ Tm determines all of the alphabet symbols,
the symbol used for the blank space, and the like, and determines there position
within the intuitive word being represented by [g]. Also for each j such that 0 ≤ j ≤
m, f ′(j) = i(a) ∈ i[W ] = T, where i(a) is the “encoding” in T of the symbol “a”.
For each m ∈ IN, let Pm = {f | (f ∈ Tm)∧(∃z((z ∈ E)∧(f ∈ z)∧∀x((x ∈ IN)∧(x >
m)→ ¬∃y((y ∈ T x)∧(y ∈ z)))))}. An element n ∈ ∗T is a subtle alphabet symbol if
there exists m ∈ IN and f ∈ ∗(Pm) = ( ∗P )( ∗m) = ( ∗P )m = ∗Pm ( m = ∗m) or if
δ ∈ IN∞ and f ∈
∗Pδ, and some j ∈
∗
IN such that f(j) = n. A symbol is a pure subtle
alphabet symbol if f(j) = n /∈ i[W ]. Subtle alphabet symbols can be characterized
in ∗E for they are singleton objects. A [g] ∈ ∗E represents a subtle alphabet symbol
iff there exists some f ∈ ( ∗T )0 such that [f ] = [g] = [(0, f(0))], f = {(0, f(0))}.
Theorem 7.3.2 Let d = {Fi | i ∈ IN} be a denumerable developmental
paradigm and use M1 of 9.1. For each ultraword w, that yields d via ∗S, as in
Theorem 7.3.1, the external cardinality of the collection of all pure subtle alphabet
symbols represented in each w is greater than or equal to 2ℵ0.
Proof. Consider the conceptual Kleene “tick” notation for the natural numbers
(i.e |,|| .|||, . . .). For this proof, let | correspond to 0. Every member of d = {Fi |
i ∈ IN} contains a distinct symbol-string bi that represents the natural number
followed by the “period” symbol that appears as the last two symbols in a member
of d. Consider the single Wn ∈ Mn, n > 0. Then n + 2 of these distinct symbol-
strings, the Kleene symbols and a “period” symbol, appear in Wn along with other
alphabet systems. Hence, in Wn, there are more than n+ 2 alphabet symbols.
For the embedding E , there is a Wn representation [g] ∈ E and two unique
mappings fk ∼ f0 ∼ g, where the inverse of the embedding i yields the entire
word for f0 and, for fk ∈ Pk, yields the entire word as it is join constructed from
individual symbols (eq. 1.2.4). In this case, k > n+ 2.
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Consider the *-transform. Let w = [g] be an ultraword such that for each
i ∈ IN, Fi ∈ ∗S({w}). Theorems 7.3.1 shows that such ultrawords exist. From the
definition of S, w ∈ ∗Md−σMd. Hence, there is a ν, δ ∈ IN∞ and ∗Mν ∈ { ∗Mx |
x ∈ ∗IN} such that [fδ] = [g] ∈ ∗Mν , δ > ν + 2, fδ ∈ ∗Pδ
Let K = {[1, n + 2] | n ∈ IN}. Then there exists a mapping C:K → IN such
that C([1, n + 2]) = n + 2. The mapping C is considered as yielding the intuitive
cardinality of [1, n + 2]. Hence, ∗C([1, ν + 1]) = ν + 2. To get an idea as to the
external cardinality |[1, ν + 2]| of [1, ν + 2], consider Theorem 3.1 in [16, p. 201],
where it is shown that |[1, ν + 2]| ≥ 2ℵ0 . Since |[1, δ]| ≥ |[1, ν + 2]|, and the set
of all subtle alphabet symbols that yields members of W is denumerable, then it
follows that for w the set of all pure subtle alphabet symbols also has an external
cardinality great than or equal to 2ℵ0 . This completes the proof.
With respect to the proof of Theorem 7.3.2, the function fδ determines the
alphabet composition of the ultraword w. The word w is unreadable not only due
to its infinite length but also due to the fact that it is composed of infinitely many
purely subtle alphabet symbols.
The developmental paradigm d utilized for the two previous theorems is com-
posed entirely of readable sentences. We now investigate what happens if a develop-
mental paradigm contains countably many unreadable sentences. Let the nonempty
developmental paradigm d′ be composed of at most countably many members of
∗E − E and, for countable B, let d′ ⊂ ∗B ⊂ ∗P0. Construct, as previously, the set
MB from B, rather than from d and suppose that B ∩Mi = ∅, i 6= 0. [See Note [2]
on page 82.] Let 6= λ ⊂ IN.
Theorem 7.3.3 Let d′ = {[gi] | i ∈ λ}. Then there exists an ultraword w ∈
∗MB − ∗B such that for each i ∈ IN, [gi] ∈ ∗S({w}).
Proof. Consider the internal binary relation G = {(x, y) | (x ∈ ∗B) ∧ (y ∈
∗MB −
∗B) ∧ (x ∈ ∗S({y})}. Note that members of d′ are members of σE or,
at the most, denumerably many members of ∗E − σE . From the analysis in the
proof of Theorem 7.3.1, for a finite F ⊂ B, there exists some y ∈MB − B such that
F ⊂ S({y}). It follows by *-transfer that if F is a finite or *-finite subset of ∗B,
then there exists some y ∈ ∗MB −
∗B such that F ⊂ ∗S({y}). As in the proof of
Theorem 7.3.1, this yields that G is at least concurrent on ∗B. However, d′ ⊂ ∗B
and |d′| ≤ ℵ0. From ℵ1-saturation, there exists some w ∈ ∗MB− ∗B such that for
each [gi] ∈ d′, [gi] ∈ ∗S({w}). This completes the proof.
Let ∅ 6= λ, γ ⊂ IN, j ∈ γ, Dj = {dij | i ∈ λ}, and for each j ∈ γ, i ∈ λ, dij ⊂
∗B is considered to be a developmental paradigm either of type d or type d′ and
B ∩Mi = ∅, i 6= 0. Notice that Dj may be either a finite or denumerable set and
Theorem 7.3.1 holds for the case that d ⊂ B, where w ∈ ∗MB − ∗B. For each
dij ∈ Dj , use the Axiom of Choice to select an ultraword wij ∈ ∗MB − ∗B that
exists by Theorems 7.3.1 (extended) or 7.3.3. Let {wij | i ∈ λ} be ultrawords.
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Theorem 7.3.4 For j ∈ γ, there exists an ultimate ultraword w′j ∈
∗MB− ∗B
such that for each i ∈ λ, wij ∈ ∗S({w′j}) and, hence, for each dij ∈ Dj , dij ⊂
∗S({wij}) ⊂ ∗S({w′j}).
Proof. For each finite {F1, . . . ,Fn} ⊂ MB − B there is a natural number, saym,
such that for each i = 1, . . . , n, Fi ∈Mj for some j ≤ m. Hence, taking b ∈ Mm+1,
we obtain that each Fi ∈ S({b}). Observe that b /∈ B. By *-transfer, it follows that
the internal relation G = {(x, y) | (x ∈ ∗MB −
∗B) ∧ (y ∈ ∗MB −
∗B) ∧ (x ∈
∗S({y})} is concurrent on internal ∗MB − ∗B and {wij | i ∈ λ} ⊂ ∗MB − ∗B.
Again ℵ1-saturation yields that there is some w′j ∈
∗MB − ∗B such that for each
i ∈ λ, wij ∈ ∗S({w′j}). The last property is obtained from dij ⊂
∗S({wij}) ⊂
∗S( ∗S({w′j})) =
∗S({w′j}) since {wij} is an internal subset of
∗P0. This completes
the proof.
Corollary 7.3.4.1 There exists an ultimate ultraword w′ ∈ ∗MB − ∗B such
that for each j ∈ γ, w′j ∈
∗S({w′}) and, hence, for each dij ∈
⋃
Dj , dij ⊂
∗S({w′j}) ⊂
∗S({w′}).
The same analysis used to obtain Theorem 7.3.2 can be applied to the ultra-
words of Theorems 7.3.3 and 7.3.4. (See note [5].)
7.4 Ultracontinuous Deduction
In 1968, a special topology on the set of all nonempty subsets of a given set X
was constructed and investigated by your author. We apply a similar topology to
subsets of E .
Suppose that nonempty X ⊂ E . Let τ be the discrete topology on X. In order
to topologize P(X), proceed as follows: for each G ∈ τ, let N(G) = {A | (A ⊂
X) ∧ (A ⊂ G)} = P(G). Consider B = {N(G) | G ∈ τ} to be a base for a topology
τ1 on P(X). Let A ∈ N(G1) ∩N(G1). The discrete topology implies that N(A) is
a base element and that N(A) ⊂ N(G1) ∩N(G2). There is only one member of B
that contains X and this is P(X). Thus if P(X) is covered by members of B, then
N(X) = P(X) is one of these covering objects. Thus (P(X), τ1) is a compact space.
Further, since N(∅) ⊂ N(G) for each G ∈ τ, the space (P(X), τ1) is connected. The
topology τ1 is a special case of a more general topology with the same properties.
[2] Suppose that D ⊂ X. Let D ∈ N(G) = P(G), G ∈ τ. Then D ∈ N(D) ⊂ N(G).
This yields that the nonstandard monad is µ(D) =
⋂
{ ∗N(G) | N(G) ∈ B} =
∗(P(D)) = ∗P( ∗D).
Theorem 7.4.1 Any consequence operator C: (P(X), τ1)→ (P(X), τ1) is con-
tinuous.
Proof. Let A ∈ P(X) and H ∈ ∗C[µ(A)]. Then there exists some B ∈ µ(A)
such that ∗C(B) = H. Hence, B ∈ ∗P( ∗A). By *-transfer of a basic property of
our consequence operators, ∗C(B) ⊂ ∗C( ∗A) = ∗(C(A)). Thus ∗(C(B)) ∈
∗(P(C(A))) implies that ∗C(B) ∈ µ(A). Therefore, ∗C[µ(A)] ⊂ µ([C(A)]).
Consequently, C is continuous.
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Corollary 7.4.1.1 For any X ⊂ E , and any consequence operator C:P(X)→
P(X), the map ∗C: ∗(P(X))→ ∗(P(X)) is ultracontinuous.
Corollary 7.4.1.2 Let d [resp. d′, d or d′] be a developmental paradigm as
defined for Theorem 7.3.1 [resp. Theorem 7.3.3, 7.3.4]. Let w be a ultraword that
exists by Theorem 7.3.1 [resp Theorem 7.3.3, 7.3.4]. Then d [resp. d′, d or d′] is
obtained by means of a ultracontinuous subtle deductive process applied to {w}.
Recall that in the real valued case, a function f : [a, b]→ IR is uniformly continu-
ous on [a, b] iff for each p, q ∈ ∗ [a, b] such that p−q ∈ µ(0), then f(p)−f(q) ∈ µ(0).
If D ⊂ [a, b] is compact, then p, q ∈ ∗D and p − q ∈ µ(0) imply that there is a
standard r ∈ D such that p, q ∈ µ(r). Also, for each r ∈ D and any p, q ∈ µ(r), it
follows that p− q ∈ µ(r). Thus, if compact D ⊂ [a, b], then f : D → IR is uniformly
continuous iff for every r ∈ D and each p, q ∈ µ(r), ∗f(p), ∗f(q) ∈ µ(f(r)).
With this characterization in mind, it is clear that any consequence operator
C:P(X) → P(X) satisfies the following statement. For each A ∈ P(X) and each
p, q ∈ µ(A), ∗C(p), ∗C(q) ∈ µ(C(A)).
From the above discussion, one can think of ultracontinuity as being a type of
ultrauniform continuity.
7.5 Hypercontinuous Gluing
There are various methods that can be used to investigate the behavior of
adjacent frozen segments. All of these methods depend upon a significant result
relative to discrete real or vector valued functions. The major goal in this section
is to present a complete proof of this major result and to indicate how it is applied.
First, as our standard structure, consider either the intuitive real numbers
as atoms or axiomatically a standard structure with atoms ZFR = ZF + AC +
A1(atoms) + A(atoms) + |A| = c, where A is isomorphic to the real numbers
and A1 ∩ A = ∅. Then, as done previously, there is a model 〈C,∈,=〉 within
our ZF + AC model for ZFR, where A has all of the ordered field proper-
ties as the real numbers. A superstructure 〈R,∈,=〉 is constructed in the usual
manner, where the superstructure 〈N ,∈,=〉 is a substructure. Proceeding as
in Chapter 2, construct ∗M1 = 〈 ∗R,∈=〉 and Y1. The structure Y1 is called
the Extended Grundlegend Structure — the EGS. The Grundlegend Structure is a
substructure of Y1.
It is important to realized in what follows that the objects utilized for the
G-structure interpretations are nonempty finite equivalence classes of partial se-
quences. Due to this fact, the following results should not lead to ambiguous inter-
pretations.
As a preliminary to the technical aspects of this final section, we introduce the
following definition. A function f : [a, b] → IRm is differentiable-C on [a, b] if it is
continuously differentiable on (a, b) except at finitely many removable discontinu-
ities. This definition is extended to the end points {a, b} by application of one-sided
derivatives. For any [a, b], consider a partition P = {a0, a1, · · · , an, an+1}, n ≥
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1, a = a0, b = an+1 and aj−1 < aj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n+1. For any such partition P, let the
real valued function g be defined on the set D = [a0, a1)∪ (a1, a2)∪ · · · ∪ (an, an+1]
as follows: for each x ∈ [a0, a1), let g(x) = r1 ∈ IR; for each x ∈ (aj−1, aj), let
g(x) = rj ∈ IR, 1 < i ≤ n; for each x ∈ (an, b], let g(x) = rn+1 ∈ IR. It is obvious
that g is a type of simple step function. Notationally, let F(A,B) denote the set of
all functions with domain A and codomain B.
Theorem 7.5.1 There exists a function G ∈ ∗(F([a, b], IR)) with the following
properties.
(i) The function G is *-continuously *-differentiable and *-uniformly *-
continuous on ∗ [a, b],
(ii) for each odd n ∈ ∗IN, (n ≥ 3), G is *- differentiable-C of order n on
∗ [a, b],
(iii) for each even n ∈ ∗IN, G is *-continuously *-differentiable in ∗[a, b]
except at finitely many points,
(iv) if c = min{r1, · · · , rn+1}, d = max{r1, · · · , rn+1}, then the range of
G = ∗ [c, d], st(G) at least maps D into [c, d] and (st(G))|D = g.
Proof. First, for any real c, d, where d 6= 0, consider the finite set of functions
hj(x, c, d) = (1/2)(rj+1 − rj)
(
sin
(
(x − c)pi/(2d)
)
+ 1
)
+ rj , (7.5.1)
1 ≤ j ≤ n. Each hj is continuously differentiable for any order at each x ∈ IR.
Observe that for each odd m ∈ IN, each m’th derivative h
(m)
j is continuous at (c+d)
and (c− d) and h
(m)
j (c+ d) = h
(m)
j (c− d) = 0 for each j.
Let positive δ ∈ µ(0). Consider the finite set of internal intervals {[a0, a1 −
δ), (a1 + δ, a2 − δ), · · · , (an + δ, b]} obtained from the partition P. Denote these
intervals in the expressed order by Ij , 1 ≤ j ≤ n+ 1. Define the internal function
G1 = {(x, r1)|x ∈ I1} ∪ · · · ∪ {(x, rn+1)|x ∈ In+1}. (7.5.2)
Let internal I†j = [aj − δ, aj + δ], 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and for each x ∈ I
†
j , let internal
Gj(x) = (1/2)(rj+1 − rj)
(
∗sin
(
(x − aj)pi/(2δ)
)
+ 1
)
+ rj . (7.5.3)
Define the internal function
G2 = {(x,G1(x))|x ∈ I
†
1} ∪ · · · ∪ {(x,Gn(x))|x ∈ I
†
n}. (7.5.4)
The final step is to define G = G1 ∪G2. Then G ∈ ∗(F([a, b], IR)).
By *-transfer, the function G1 has an internal *-continuous *- derivative G
(1)
1
such that G
(1)
1 (x) = 0 for each x ∈ I1 ∪ · · · ∪ In+1. Applying *-transfer to the
properties of the functions hj(x, c, d), it follows that G2 has a unique internal *-
continuous *-derivative
G
(1)
2 = (1/(4δ))(rj+1 − rj)pi
(
∗cos
(
(x− aj)pi/(2δ)
))
(7.5.5)
74 Robert A. Herrmann
for each x ∈ I†1 ∪ · · · ∪ I
†
n. The results that the *-left limit for the internal G
(1)
1 and
the *-right limit for internal G
(1)
2 at each aj−δ as well as the *-left limit of G
(1)
2 and
*-right limit of G
(1)
1 at each aj+δ are equal to 0 and 0 = G
(1)
2 (aj−δ) = G
(1)
2 (aj+δ)
imply that internal G has a *-continuous *- derivative G(1) = G
(1)
1 ∪ G
(1)
2 defined
on ∗ [a, b].
A similar analysis and *-transfer yield that for each m ∈ ∗IN, m ≥ 2, G has
an internal *-continuous *-derivative G(m) defined at each x ∈ ∗ [a, b] except at the
points aj ± δ whenever rj+1 6= rj . However, it is obvious from the definition of the
functions hj that for each odd m ∈
∗
IN, m ≥ 3, each internal G(m) can be made
*-continuous at each aj ± δ by simply defining G(m)(aj ± δ) = 0 and with this parts
(i), (ii), and (iii) are established.
For part (iv), assume that rj ≤ rj+1. From the definition of the functions hj ,
it follows that for each x ∈ Ij ∪ I
†
j ∪ Ij+1, rj ≤ G(x) ≤ rj+1. The nonstandard
intermediate value theorem implies that G
[
∗ [aj , aj+1]
]
= ∗ [rj , rj+1] and in like
manner for the case that rj+1 < rj . Hence, G
[
∗ [a, b]
]
= ∗ [c, d]. Clearly, st( ∗D) =
[a, b]. If p ∈ D and x ∈ µ(p) ∩ ∗D, then G(x) = rj = g(p) for some j such that
1 ≤ j ≤ n+ 1. This completes the proof.
The nonstandard approximation theorem 7.5.1 can be extended easily to func-
tions that map D into IRm. For example, assume that F :D → IR3, the component
functions F1, F2 are continuously differentiable on [a, b]; but that F3 is a g type
step function on D. Then letting H = ( ∗F1,
∗F2, G), on
∗ [a, b], where G is de-
fined in Theorem 4.1, we have an internal *-continuously *-differentiable function
H : ∗ [a, b]→ ∗IR3, with the property that st(H)|D = F.
With respect to Theorem 7.5.1, it is interesting to note that if hj is defined on
IR, then for even orders n ∈ IN,
(7.5.6) | h
(n)
j (c± d) | =
∣∣∣∣(rj+1 − rj)pi
n
2n+1dn
∣∣∣∣= 0
for rj+1 = rj but not 0 otherwise. If rj+1 − rj 6= 0, then G
(n)
2 (aj ± δ) is an infinite
nonstandard real number. Indeed, ifmi is an increasing sequence of even numbers in
∗
IN and rj+1 6= rj , then |G
(mi)
2 (aj ± δ)| forms a decreasing sequence of nonstandard
infinite numbers. The next result is obvious from the previous result.
Corollary 7.5.1.1 For each n ∈ ∗IN, then internal G(n) = G
(n)
1 ∪ G
(n)
2 is
*-bounded on ∗ [a, b].
Let D(a, b) be the set of all bounded and piecewise continuously differen-
tiable functions defined on [a, b]. By considering all of the possible (finitely many)
subintervals, where f ∈ D(a, b), it follows from the Riemann sum approach that for
each real ν > 0, there exists a real ν1 > 0 such that for each real νi, 0 < νi < ν1, a
sequence of partitions Pi = {a = bi0 < · · · < b
i
ki
= b} can be selected such that the
mesh(Pi) ≤ νi and
(7.5.7) |(f(b)− f(a))−
ki∑
n=1
f ′(tn)(b
i
n − b
i
n−1)| < ν
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for any tn ∈ (bin−1, b
i
n).
Moreover, for any given number M, the sequence of partitions can be so con-
structed such that there exists a j such that for each i > j, ki > M, where Pi and
Pj are partitions within the sequence of partitions. By *-transfer of these facts and
by application of Theorem 7.5.1 and its corollary we have the next result.
Corollary 7.5.1.2 For each n ∈ IN and each internal G(n), the difference
G(n)(b) − G(n)(a) is infinitesimally close to an (externally) infinity *-finite sum of
infinitesimals.
A developmental paradigm is a very general object and, therefore, can be used
for numerous applications. At present, developmental paradigms are still being
viewed from the substratum or external world. For what follows, it is assumed
that a developmental paradigm d traces the evolutionary history of a specifically
named natural system or systems. In this first application, let each Fi ∈ d have the
following property (P).
Fi describes “the general behavior and characteristics of the named
natural system S1 as well as the behavior and characteristics of
named constituents contained within S1 at time ti.”
Recall that for Fi, Fi+1 ∈ d, there exist unique functions f0 ∈ Fi = [f ], g0 ∈
Fi+1 = [g] such that f0, g0 ∈ T 0 and {(0, f0(0))} ∈ [f ], {(0, g0(0))} ∈ [g]. Thus,
to each Fj ∈ d, correspond the unique natural number f0(0). Let D = [ti−1, ti) ∪
(ti, ti+1] and define f1:D → IN as follows: for each x ∈ [ti−1, ti), let f1(x) = f0(0);
for each x ∈ (ti, ti+1], let f1(x) = g0(0). Application of theorem 7.5.1 yields the
internal function G such that G|D = f1. For these physical applications, utilize the
term “substratum” in the place of the technical terms “pure nonstandard.” [Note:
Of course, elsewhere, the term “pure NSP-world” or simply the “NSP-world” is
used as a specific name for what has here been declared as the substratum.] This
yields the following statements, where the symbols Fi and Fi+1 are defined and
characterized by the expression inside the quotation marks in property (P).
(A): There exists a substratum hypercontinuous, hypersmooth, hy-
peruniform process G that binds together Fi and Fi+1.
(B): There exists a substratum hypercontinuous, hypersmooth, hy-
peruniform alteration process G that transforms Fi into Fi+1.
(C): There exists an ultracontinuous subtle force-like (i.e. deduc-
tive) process that yields Fi for each time ti within the development
of the natural system.
In order to justify (A) and (B), specific measures of physical properties as-
sociated with constituents may be coupled together. Assume that for a subword
ri ∈ Fi ∈ d, the symbols ri denote a numerical quantity that aids in characterizing
the behavior of an object in a system S1 or the system itself. Let (M1) be the
statement:
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“There exists a substratum hypercontinuous, hypersmooth, hyper-
uniform functional process Gi such that Gi when restricted to the
standard mathematical domain it is fi and such that Gi hypercon-
tinuously changes ri for system S1 at time ti into ri+1 for system
S1 at time ti+1.”
This modeling procedure yields the following interpretation:
(D) If there exists a continuous or uniform [resp. discrete] func-
tional process fi that changes ri for S1 at time ti into ri+1 for S1
at time ti+1, then (M1).
At a particular moment ti, two natural systems S1 and S2 may interface. More
generally, two very distinct developmental paradigms may exist one d1 at times prior
to ti (in the ti past) and one d2 at time after ti (in the ti future). We might refer
to the time ti as a standard time fracture. Consider the developmental paradigm
d3 = d1∪d2. In this case, the paradigms may be either of type d or d′. For the type
d′, the corresponding system need not be considered a natural system but could be
a pure substratum system.
At ti an Fi ∈ d3 can be characterized by statement (P) (with the term natural
removed if Fi is a member of a d
′). In like manner, Fi+1 at time ti+1 can be
characterized by (P). Statements (A), (B), (C) can now be applied to d3 and
a modified statement (D), where the second symbol string S1 is changed to S2.
Notice that this modeling applies to the actual human ability that only allows for
two discrete descriptions to be given, one for the interval [ti−1, ti) and one for the
interval (ti, ti+1]. From the modeling viewpoint, this is often sufficient since the
length of the time intervals can be made smaller than Planck time.
Recall that an analysis of the scientific method used in the investigation of
natural system should take place exterior to the language used to describe the
specific system development. Suppose thatD is the language accepted for a scientific
discipline and that within D various expressions from mathematical theories are
used. Further, suppose that enough of the modern theory of sets is employed so
that the EGS can be constructed. The following statement would hold true for D.
If by application of first-order logic to a set of non-mathematical
premises taken from D it is claimed that it is not logically possible
for statements such as (A), (B), (C) and (D) to hold, then the set
of premises is inconsistent.
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NOTES
[1] Note that this last requirement for B can be achieved as follows: construct a
special symbol not originally in A. Then this symbol along with A is considered the
alphabet. Next only consider a B that does not contain this special symbol within
any of its members. Now using this special symbol in place of the ∧, consistently
construct Mi, i 6= 0. Of course, ∧ is interpreted as this special symbol in the axiom
system S.
[2] The actual members, Fi, of a developmental paradigm d need not be unique.
However, the specific information contained in each readable word used for a specific
Fi ∈ IN is unique. Other readable sentences can be used in place of a specific Fi
as long as they are “equivalent” in the sense that the specific information being
displayed by each is the same information.
[3] Depending upon the application, a single standard word may also be termed
as an ultraword.
[4] For a method to obtain an ultraword for a refined developmental paradigm,
see pages 4 - 7 in http://arxiv.org/abs/math.0605120
[5] (Added 9/20/2009.) A concurrent relation is not needed to obtain important
“ultrawords.”
Theorem 7.3.5 For d = {Fn | n ∈ IN} and each infinite λ ∈ IN∞, there exists
one and only one wλ ∈ ∗Mλ and hyperfinite dλ such that d ⊂ dλ ⊂ ∗S({wλ}),
and dλ ⊂ ∗d.
Proof. For each, n ∈ IN, let G(n) = {Fi | 0 ≤ i ≤ n} ⊂ d. Thus, G: IN→ F(d)
the set of all finite subsets of d. Let n > 0. ThenMn has one and only one member
and by definition wn ∈ Mn has the property that G(n) ⊂ S({wn}). Hence, by
*-transfer, for the function ∗M, and each λ ∈ IN∞, there is one and only one
wλ ∈
∗Mλ such that hyperfinite
∗G(λ) ⊂ ∗S({wλ}). Finally, by defintion of G,
d ⊂ ∗G(λ) ⊂ ∗d.
Note that theorems that generate or use ultrawords may need to be trivially
modified or not used depending upon the definition for d. For example, for the
ordering used in [1], then the ultraword used and its location would be an ultimate
ultraword as generated in theorem 7.3.4, where each wij is an ultraword or ultimate
ultraword that, upon application of ∗S, yields the developmental paradigm for each
interval [ci, ci+1).
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8. A SPECIAL APPLICATION
8.1 A Neutron Altering Process.
The purpose of this chapter is to justify the interpretations utilized in reference
[1]. Let B be the set of all nondecreasing bounded real valued functions defined on
D = [a, t′)∪(t′, T ]. Let Q ∈ B and Q(t) = 2 for each t ∈ [a, t′); Q(t) = 3 for each t ∈
(t′, T ] be the discrete neutron altering process. Application of Theorem 7.5.1 implies
that there exists internal G: ∗ [a, T ]→ ∗IR such that st(G)|D = G|D = Q, and G is
hypercontinuous, hypersmooth, hyperaltering process defined on the hyperinterval
∗ [a, T ]. Hence, G satisfies statement (A) in section (2) of [1]. Theorem 7.5.1 also
implies that G is hyperuniformly continuous on ∗ [a, T ].
Recall how a *-special partition for ∗ [a, T ] is generated. Let 0 < ∆t ∈ IR+.
Then P (∆t) = {a = t0 ≤ · · · tn ≤ tn+1 = T }, where n is the largest natural
number such that a + n(∆t) ≤ T and for i = 0, . . . , (n − 1); ti+1 − ti = ∆t, and
tn+1 − tn = b − (a + n(∆t)) < ∆t. It is possible that tn+1 = tn. If P is the set of
all special partitions, then letting dt ∈ µ(0)+ (the set of all positive infinitesimals)
it follows that P (dt) ∈ ∗P and P (dt) has the same first-order properties as does
P (∆t).
Theorem 8.1.1 Let internal G be hypercontinuous on ∗C = ∗ [a, T ] and
zj ∈ (a, T ), j = 1, . . . ,m. For any dx ∈ µ(0)+, there exists a dy ∈ µ(0)+ such that
for each x, y ∈ ∗D such that |x − y| < dy it follows that |G(x) − G(y)| < dx,
and there is a hyperfinite partition {a = t′0 < · · · < t
′
ν+1 = T } such that for
i = 0, . . . , ν+1; j = 1, . . . ,m we have t′j 6= zj, G(t
′
i+1)−G(t
′
i) ∈ µ(0), t
′
i+1−t
′
i ∈ µ(0)
and G(T )−G(a) =
∑ν
0(G(t
′
i+1)−G(t
′
i)).
Proof. Since internal G is *-uniformly continuous, it follows that for any dy ∈
µ(0)+ there exists some δ such that 0 < δ ∈ ∗IR and for each x, y ∈ ∗ [a, T ]
such that |x − y| < δ, it follows that |G(x) − G(y)| < dx. Now let dy < δ and
dy ∈ µ(0)+ and consider the *-special partition P (dy/3). Let y ∈ [ti, ti+1], x ∈
[ti+1, ti+2], i = 0, . . . , ν − 1 and x, y 6= t′. Then |y − x| < dy and each *-closed
interval is nonempty. By means of internal first-order statements that imply the
existence of certain objects and the choice axiom, select t′0 = a, t
′
ν+1 = T and if
tν+1 = tν , then for i = 1, . . . , ν − 2 select some t′i ∈ [ti, ti+1] such that t
′
i 6= zj for
j = 1, . . . ,m; or if tν+1 6= tν , then for i = 1, . . . , ν − 1 select some t′i ∈ [ti, ti+1]
such that t′i 6= zj for j = 1, . . . ,m. This yields a hyperfinite internal partition
with the properties listed in the hypothesis and by*-transfer of the properties of a
finite telescoping series, we have that G(T ) − G(a) =
∑ν
0((G(t
′
i+1) − G(t
′
i)), and
|G(t′i+1)−G(t
′
i)| < dx for i = 0, . . . , ν implies that G(t
′
i+1)−G(t
′
i) ∈ µ(0) and each
t′i ∈
∗D has the property that |t′i+1 − t
′
i| < dy. This complete the proof.
We now apply Theorem 8.1.1 to the discrete altering function Q. Let Q be the
set of all finite partitions of D. Then, for n > 0 and the partition {a = t0 < t1 <
· · · < tn ≤ tn+1 = T }, consider the partial sequence S: [0, n + 1] → IR defined by
S(i) = ti, i = 0, . . . , n + 1. Define Ti = [ti, ti+1], i = 0, . . . , n. Consider the set
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H = {Ti | i = 0, . . . , n}. Then H ∈ P(C), where C = [a, T ]. There is an N ∈
IR
P(C)−∅ such that N(Ti) = Q(ti+1)−Q(ti), Q(ti) = ri, i = 0, . . . , n. The function
N is a resolving process for the function Q and each ri is a degree for the constituent
N(Ti). LetM(Q) be the set of all such resolving processes generated by the infinite
set of finite partitions of D for a fixed Q. Consider the *-finite partition P (dy/3) of
D generated in the proof of Theorem 8.1.1. Now modify this *-finite partition in the
following manner. Consider the standard finite partition generated by S: [0, n+1]→
IR. Let Ti = [ti, ti+1] = [S(i), S(i+1)], ti 6= t′, i = 0, . . . , n; H = {Ti | i = 0, . . . , n}
and, for the fixed Q, N(ti) = Q(ti+1) − Q(ti) = G(ti+1) − G(ti), i = 0, . . . , n,
where G is in the statement of Theorem 8.1.1. This sequence S extends in the
usual manner to ∗S: [0, ν + 1]→ ∗IR.
Since 0 < |ti − tj |, where i 6= j, for each ti there exists a *-closed interval
[vj , vj+1] generated by P (dy/3) such that ti ∈ (vj , vj+1), or ti = vj or vj+1 not
both. In the case that ti ∈ (vj , vj+1), the interval is unique. Moreover, there
are only finitely many such ti in the standard partition. Hence for these finitely
many real number cases, where ti ∈ (vj , vj+1), modify the partition by subdividing
[vj , vj+1] into two intervals [vj , ti]∪[ti, vj+1]. This process can, obviously, be defined
by a finite set of first-order statements. This adds an additional finite number of
intervals to our hyperfinite partition and yields a partition number λ ∈ ∗IN to replace
ν. Since the infinitesimal length of these adjoined intervals is < dy/3, Theorem 8.1.1
still holds with λ replacing ν. This yields an internal sequence S′: [0, λ + 1] → ∗IR
such that S′(i) = t′i as defined in the proof of Theorem 8.1.1 with the condition
that finitely many of the t′j correspond to the standard partition elements ti. (Notice
that, for all of this construction, the assumed n is fixed.)
From the above, we have the *-closed intervals T ′i = [t
′
i, t
′
i+1], i = 0, . . . , λ as
well as the internal H ′ = {z | (z ∈ ∗P( ∗ [a, T ])∧(∃i(i ∈ [0, λ])∧∀x(x ∈ z ↔ S′(i) ≤
x ≤ S′(i + 1)))}. Obviously, H ′ ∈ ∗(P(C)). Thus there is in ∗M(Q) an internal
hyperresolving processN ′ such thatN ′(T ′i ) =
∗Q(t′i+1)−
∗Q(t′i+1) = G(t
′
i+1)−G(ti),
where T ′ = [S′(i), S′(i + 1)] ∈ H ′ and i = 0, . . . , λ.
Technically, it is not true that H ⊂ H ′. Thus define the standard restriction
of N ′ to N, where N is generated by the standard sequence S: [0, n+ 1]→ IR that
is obtained as follows: consider the set {S′(i) | i = 0, . . . , λ + 1} ∩ [a, T ] = P0.
Since P0 is a finite standard set, it can be ordered by the < of the reals and let
P0 = {a = t0 < ti < · · · tn ≤ tn+1 = T.} This yields a sequence S”: [0, n + 1] →
IR, S”(i) = ti, i = 0, . . . , n + 1. Let S” = S. Utilizing S”, generate the original
resolving process N from N ′.
Application of Theorem 8.1.1 yields the following description. There exists a
hyperpartition (generated by) S′ for the hyperinterval ∗D (since t′ ∈ range S′)
and S′ (generates) the hyperresolution N ′ for the hyperaltering process G. The
hyperresolution N ′ is defined on the hyperfinitely many internal subintervals of
∗ [a, T ] and the range of N ′ is composed of hyperfinitely many hyperconstitutents
G(t′i+1) −G(t
′
i) that, by *-transfer of the standard supremum function defined on
nonempty finite sets of real numbers, yields a maximum degree among all of the de-
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grees of the hyperconstitutents. This maximum degree is infinitesimal, by Theorem
8.1.1, and since G(T )−G(a) ∈ IR+ and taking G as nondecreasing, this maximum
degree is a positive infinitesimal. By the above restriction process, N is the re-
striction of N ′ to the standard world. Consequently, N ′ satisfies statement (B) in
section 4 of [1].
Finally, the length function L defined on the set of all closed intervals extends
to the set of all *-closed intervals that are subsets of ∗IR. Then ∗L( ∗ [a, T ]) =
T − a = L([a, T ]). Thus (C) of section 4 in [1] holds. (D) in section 4 of [1] follows
from the unused conclusions that appear in Theorem 8.1.1, among others.
For the nondecreasing bounded classical neutron altering process CQ, there is
assumed to exist a standard smooth function f defined on [a, t] such that f |D = CQ.
Now define standard G: [a, T ]→ IR as follows: let G0(t) = f(t), t ∈ [a, t
′); G1(t) =
f(t), t ∈ (t′, T ]. Then since G0(t0) ≤ G1(t1), for t0 ∈ [a, t′) and t1 ∈ (t′, T ], it follows
that h = sup{G0(t) | t ∈ [a, t′)} exists, and we can let G = G0 ∪ G1 ∪ {(t′, h)}.
Obviously, G(t0) ≤ G(t′) ≤ G(t1), t0 ∈ [a, t′), t1 ∈ (t′, T ], and G|D = CQ. It
follows from left and right limit considerations that G = f. (Note: G is defined
in this manner only to conform to the discrete case.) Theorem 8.1.1 holds for ∗G
and, in this case, we simply repeat the entire discussion that appears after that
statement of Theorem 8.1.1 and replace the G that appears in that discussion with
∗G = ∗f. This yields a model for statements (E), (F), (G) and (H) in section 4 of
reference [1].
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9. NSP-WORLD ALPHABETS
9.1 An Extension.
Although it is often not necessary, we assume when its useful that we are
working within the EGS. Further, this structure is assumed to be |M1|
+
-saturated,
and a polyenlargement [5, p. 35], whereM1 = 〈R,∈,=〉, (orM1 = 〈Q,∈,=〉, where
Q is the set of rational numbers). Referring to the paragraph prior to Theorem
7.3.3, it can be assumed that the developmental paradigm d′ ⊂ ∗B ⊂ ∗P0. It
is not assumed that such a developmental paradigm is obtained from the process
discussed in Theorem 7.2.1, although a modification of the proof of Theorem 7.2.1
appears possible in order to allow this method of selection.
Theorem 9.1.1 Let d′ = {[gi] | i ∈ λ}, |λ| < |M1|
+
. There exists an ultraword
w ∈ ∗MB − ∗B such that for each i ∈ λ, [gi] ∈ ∗S({w}).
Proof. The same as Theorem 7.3.3 with the change in saturation.
Let D = {di | i ∈ λ}, |λ| < |M1|
+
, |di| < |M1|
+
and each di ⊂ ∗B is
considered to be a developmental paradigm either of type d or type d′. For each
di ∈ D, use the Axiom of Choice to select an ultraword wi ∈ ∗MB − ∗B that
exists by Theorems 9.1.1. Let {wi | i ∈ λ} be such a set of ultrawords.
Theorem 9.1.2 There exists an ultraword w′ ∈ ∗MB − ∗B such that for
each i ∈ λ, wi ∈ ∗S({w′}) and, hence, for each di ∈ D, di ⊂ ∗S({w′}).
Proof. The same as Theorem 7.3.4 with the change in saturation.
9.2 NSP-World Alphabets.
First, recall the following definition. Pm = {f | (f ∈ Tm) ∧ (∃z((z ∈ E) ∧ (f ∈
z) ∧ ∀x((x ∈ IN) ∧ (x > m) → ¬∃y((y ∈ T x) ∧ (y ∈ z)))))}. The set T = i[W ].
The set Pm determines the unique partial sequence f ∈ [g] ∈ E that yields, for each
j ∈ IN such that 0 ≤ j ≤ m, f(j) = i(a), where i(a) is an “encoding” in A1 of
the alphabet symbol “a” used to construct our intuitive language W . The set [g]
represents an intuitive word constructed from such an alphabet of symbols.
Within the discipline of Mathematical Logic, it is assumed that there exists
symbols — a sequence of variables — each one of which corresponds, in a one-to-one
manner, to a natural number. Further, under the subject matter of generalized first-
order theories [2], it isassumed that the cardinality of the set of constants is greater
than ℵ0. In the forthcoming investigation, it may be useful to consider an alphabet
that injectively corresponds to the real numbers IR. This yields a new alphabet
A′ containing our original alphabet. A new collection of words W ′ composed of
nonempty finite strings of such alphabet symbols may be constructed. It may also
be useful to well-order IR. The set E also exists with respect to the set of wordsW ′.
Using the ESG, many previous results in this book now hold with respect to W ′
and for the case that we are working in a |M1|
+
-saturated polyenlargement.
With respect to this extended language, if you wish to except the possibility,
a definition as to what constitutes a purely subtle alphabet symbol would need to
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be altered in the obvious fashion. Indeed, for T in the definition of Pm, we need to
substitute T ′ = i[W ′]. Then the altered definition would read that r ∈ ∗A1 ≃ ∗IR
is a pure subtle alphabet symbol if there exists an m ∈ IN and f ∈ ∗(Pm), or if
m ∈ ∗IN − IN an f ∈ Pm, and some j ∈ ∗IR such that f(j) = r /∈ i[W ′]. Further,
some of the previous theorems also hold when the proofs are modified.
Although these extended languages are of interest to the mathematician, most
of science is content with approximating a real number by means of a rational
number. In all that follows, the cardinality of our language, if not denumerable,
will be specified. All theorems from this book that are used to establish a result
relative to a denumerable language will be stated without qualification. If a theorem
has not been reestablished for a higher language but can be so reestablished, then
the theorem will be termed an extended theorem.
9.3 General Paradigms.
There is the developmental paradigm, and for nondetailed descriptions the
general developmental paradigm. But now we have something totally new — the
general paradigm. It is important to note that the general paradigm is considered
to be distinct from developmental paradigms, although certain results that hold
for general paradigms will hold for developmental paradigms and conversely. For
example, associated with each general paradigm GA is an ultraword wg such that
the set GA ⊂ ∗S({wg}) and all other theorems relative to such ultrawords hold
for general paradigms. The general paradigm is a collection of words that discuss,
in general, the behavior of entities and other constituents of a natural system.
They, usually, do not contain a time statement Wi as it appears in section 7.1 for
developmental paradigm descriptions. Our interest in this section is relative to only
two such general paradigms. The reader can easily generate many other general
paradigms.
Let c′ be a symbol that denotes some fixed real number and n′ a symbol that
denotes a natural number. [Note: what follows is easily extended to an extended
language.] Suppose that you have a theory which includes each member of the
following set (i suppressed).
GA = {An|||elementary|||particle|||α(n′)|||with|||
(9.3.1) kinetic|||energy|||c′+1/(n′). | n ∈ G ∧ n 6= 0},
where G is, at the least, a denumerable subset of the real numbers.
Of particular interest is the composition of members of ∗GA −GA. Notice
that |GA| = |G| since z1, z2 ∈ GA and z1 6= z2 iff [x1] = z1, [x2] = z2, x1(30) =
x1(2) 6= x2(30) = x2(2), x1(2), x2(2) ∈ G. Now consider the bijection K:GA → G.
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Theorem 9.3.1 The set [g] ∈ ∗GA−GA iff there exists a unique f ∈ ∗(P55)
and ν ∈ ∗G − G such that [g] = [f ], and f(55) = i(A), f(54) = i(n), f(53) =
i(|||), · · · , f(30) = f(2), · · · , f(3) = i((), f(2) = ν ∈ ∗G − G ⊂ ∗IR − IR, f(1) =
i()), f(0) = (.).
Proof. From the definition of GA the sentence
∀z(z ∈ E → ((z ∈ GA)↔ ∃!x∃!w((w ∈ G) ∧ (x ∈ P55) ∧ (x ∈ z)∧
((55, i(A)) ∈ x) ∧ ((54, i(n)) ∈ x) ∧ · · · ∧ (x(30) = x(2)) ∧ · · · ∧
((3, i(()) ∈ x) ∧ (x(2) = w) ∧ (K(z) = w)∧
((1, i())) ∈ x) ∧ ((0, i(.)) ∈ x)))). (9.3.2)
holds in M, hence in ∗M. From the fact that K is a bijection, it follows that
∗K[ ∗GA −GA] = ∗G−G ⊂ ∗IR− IR. The result now follows from *-transfer.
Using Theorem 9.3.1, each member of ∗GA −GA, when interpreted by con-
sidering i−1, has only two positions with a single missing object since positions 30
and 2 do not correspond to any symbol string in our language W . This interpre-
tation still retains a vast amount of content, however. For a specific member, you
could substitute a new constructed symbol, not in W ′, into these two missing posi-
tions. Depending upon what type of pure nonstandard number this inserted symbol
represents, the content of such a sentence could be startling. Let Γ′ be a nonempty
set of new symbols disjoint from W ′ and assume that Γ′ is injectively mapped by
H into ∗G−G.
Although human ability may preclude the actual construction of more than
denumerably many new symbols, you might consider this mapping to be onto if you
accept the ideas of extended languages with a greater cardinality. As previously,
denote these new symbols by ζ′. Now let
G′A = {An|||elementary|||particle|||α(ζ′)|||with|||
kinetic|||energy|||c′+1/(ζ′). | H(ζ′) ∈ ∗G−G}, (9.3.3)
This leads to the following interpretation stated in terms of describing sets for the
extended language.
(1) The describing set GA (mathematically) exists iff the describing
set G′A (mathematically) exists.
9.4 Interpretations
Recall that the Natural world portion of the NSP-world model may contain
undetectable objects, where “undetectable” means that there does not appear to
exist human, or humanly constructible machine sensors that directly detect the
objects or directly measure any of the objects physical properties. The rules of the
scientific method utilized within the micro-world of subatomic physics allow all such
undetectable Natural objects to be accepted as existing reality.[1] The properties of
such objects are indirectly deduced from the observed properties of gross matter.
In order to have indirect evidence of the objectively real existence of such objects,
such indirectly obtained behavior will usually satisfy a specifically accepted model.
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Although the numerical quantities associated with these undetectable Natural
(i.e. standard) world objects, if they really do exist, cannot be directly and exactly
measured via any known instrumentation, these quantities are still represented by
standard mathematical entities. By the rules of correspondence for interpreting
pure NSP-world entities, the members of G′A must be considered as undetectable
pure NSP-world objects, assuming any of them exist in this background world. On
the other hand, when viewed within the EGS, any finite as well as many infinite
subsets of G′A are internal sets. Consequently, some finite collects of such objects
may be assumed to indirectly effect behavior in the Natural world.
The concept of realism often dictates that all interpreted members of a math-
ematical model be considered as existing in reality. The philosophy of science that
accepts only partial realism allows for the following technique. One can stop at any
point within a mathematically generated physical interpretation. Then proceed
from that point to deduce an intuitive physical theory, but only using other not
interpreted mathematical formalism as auxiliary constructs or as catalysts. With
respect to the NSP-world, another aspect of interpretation enters the picture. As-
suming realism, then the question remains which, if any, of these NSP-entities actu-
ally indirectly influence Natural world processes? This interpretation process allows
for the possibility that none of these pure NSP-world entities has any effect upon
the standard world. These ideas should always be kept in mind.
If you accept that such particles as described by GA can exist in reality, then
the philosophy of realism leads to the next interpretation.
(2) If there exist elementary particles with Natural system behav-
ior described by GA, then there exist pure NSP-world objects that
display within the NSP-world behavior described by members of G′A.
The concept of absolute realism would require that the acceptance of the elemen-
tary particles described by GA is indirect evidence for the existence of the G
′
A
described objects. I caution the reader that the interpretation we apply to such
sets of sentences as GA are only to be applied to such sets of sentences.
The EGS may, of course, be interpreted in infinitely many different ways.
Indeed, the NSP-world model with its physical-type language can also be applied in
infinitely many ways to infinitely many scenarios. I have applied it to such models
as the MA-model— and the GGU-model among others. In this section, I consider
another possible interpretation relative to those Big Bang cosmologies that postu-
late real objects at or near infinite temperature, energy or pressure. These theories
incorporate the concept of the initial singularity(ies).
One of the great difficulties with many Big Bang cosmologies is that no mean-
ingful physical interpretation for formation of the initial singularity is forthcoming
from the theory itself. The fact that a proper and acceptable theory for creation
of the universe requires that consideration not only be given to the moment of
zero cosmic time but to what might have occurred “prior” to that moment in the
nontime period is what partially influenced Wheeler to consider the concept of a
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pregeometry.[3], [4] It is totally unsatisfactory to dismiss such questions as “unmean-
ingful” simply because they cannot be discussed in your favorite theory. Scientists
must search for a broader theory to include not only the question but a possible
answer.
Although the initial singularity for a Big Bang type of state of affairs apparently
cannot be discussed in a meaningful manner by many standard physical theories,
unless one adjoins to the theory an ad hoc quantum field, it can be discussed by
application of our NSP-world language. Let c′ be a symbol that represents any
fixed real number. Define
GB = {An|||elementary|||particle|||α(n′)|||with|||
total|||energy|||c′+n′. | n ∈ IN}, (9.4.1)
Application of Theorem 9.3.1 to GB yields the set
G′B = {An|||elementary|||particle|||α(ζ
′)|||with|||
total|||energy|||c′+ζ′. | ζ ∈ ∗IN− IN}, (9.4.2)
(3) If there exist elementary particles with Natural system behav-
ior described by GB, then there exist pure NSP-world objects that
display within the NSP-world behavior described by members of G′B.
The particles being described by G′B have various infinite energies. These
infinite energies do not behave in the same manner as would the real number
energy measures discussed in GB. As is usual when a metalanguage physical theory
is generated from a formalism, we can further extend and investigate the properties
of the G′B objects by imposing upon them the corresponding behavior of the positive
infinite hyperreal numbers. This produces some interesting propositions. Hence,
we are able to use a nonstandard physical world language in order to give further
insight into the state of affairs at or near a cosmic initial singularity. This gives one
solution to a portion of the pregeometry problem. I point out that there are other
NSP-world models for the beginnings of our universe, if there was such a beginning.
Of course, the statements in G′B need not be related at all to any Natural world
physical scenario, but could refer only to the behavior of pure NSP-world objects.
Notice that Theorems such as 7.3.1 and 7.3.4 relative to the generation of
developmental paradigms by ultrawords, also apply to general paradigms, where
M,MB,P0 are defined appropriately. The following is a slight extension of Theo-
rem 7.3.2 for general paradigms. Theorem 9.4.1 will also hold for developmental
paradigms.
Theorem 9.4.1 Let GC be any denumerable general paradigm. Then there
exists an ultraword w ∈ ∗P0 such that for each F ∈ GC, F ∈ ∗S({w}) and there
exist infinitely many [g] ∈ ∗GC −GC such that [g] ∈
∗S({w}).
Proof. In the proof of Theorem 7.3.2, it is shown that there exists some ν ∈
∗
IN−IN such that ∗h[[0, ν]] ⊂ ∗S({w}) and ∗h[[0, ν]] ⊂ ∗GC. Since | ∗h[[0, ν]]||M1|
+
,
then | ∗h[[0, ν]]− h[IN]| ≥ |M1|
+
, for h is a bijection. This completes the proof.
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Corollary 9.4.1.1 Theorem 9.4.1 holds, where GC is replaced by a develop-
mental paradigm.
(4) Let GC be a denumerable general paradigm. There exists an
intrinsic ultranatural process, ∗S, such that objects described by
members of GC are produced by
∗S. During this production, nu-
merously many pure NSP-objects as described by statements in
∗GC −GC are produced.
9.5 A Barrier To Knowledge.
Our final discussion in this chapter deals with the use of |M|+-saturated models
and our ability to analyze sets of sentences such as G′A. It is a very strange property
of the human mind that it often produces an infinite cause and effect sequence.
Consider the following comprehensible and potentially infinite set of sentences
{I think., I think about my thinking., I think about my thinking about my thinking.,
I think about my thinking about my thinking about my thinking., . . .}. As far as
comprehension is concerned, one can ask what would be the “first cause” for our
thinking? For the Natural sciences, we have Engel’s biological sequence of evolution-
ary causes and effects and, of course, our previously mentioned initial singularity
problem or as Misner, Thorne and Wheeler write, “No problem of cosmology digs
more deeply into the foundations of physics than the question of what ‘proceeded’
the ‘initial’ state....”[3] A Natural science question and one which contains some
logical difficulties might be “What precedes that which precedes?” Regardless of
whether or not this strange mental behavior persists when we analyze Natural sys-
tem behavior, the next result shows the existence of a possible Natural barrier to
human knowledge.
Each of our previous investigations is done with respect to a specific NSP-world
structure ∗M based upon a infinite standard set H (with a cardinality usually
equal to ℵ0) into which is mapped the symbols and words for all languages. The
requirement that H be a standard set is relative to the standard universe in which
we function. Although there are infinitely many distinct nonisomorphic NSP-world
structures, each of our results is with respect to members of a subclass of the class
of all such structures. In particular, |M|+-saturated polyenlargement , whereM is
based upon a standard set H, where IN ⊂ H.
In order to analyze general paradigms G′A, G
′
B and the like, we need to start,
I believe, with a comprehensible set of sentences, such as GA, GB, with nonempty
content and insert new symbols but retain some of the content of the original sen-
tences. What is shown next is that if we use any of our models based on H and
require them to be |M|+-saturation polyenlargement, then we cannot embed our
new alphabet into the standard set H and, thus, we cannot fully analyze sets of
sentences such as G′A, G
′
B using our embedding procedures.
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Theorem 9.5.1 Let Γ′ be a set of symbols adjoined to a countable alphabet A,
which is disjoint fromA, and such that it is used to obtain the set of sentences in G′B.
Let ∗M = 〈 ∗H,∈,=〉 be any |M|+-saturated polyenlargement of a superstructure
based on the ground set H, where here IN ⊂ H ⊂ IR. There does does not exist an
injection from Γ′ ∪ A into L, where L ∈ H.
Proof. Suppose that there exists an injection i: (Γ′ ∪A)→ L. Since the model
is a polyenlargement, then |Γ′ ∪ A| ≥ |M|+. However, |L| < |M|+. But under the
assumption |Γ′ ∪ A| ≤ |L|. This contradiction implies that the injection does not
exist and this completes the proof.
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10. LAWS, RULES AND OTHER THINGS
10.1 More About Ultrawords.
Previously, we slightly investigated the composition of an ultraword w ∈
∗Md − d. Using the idea of the minimum informal language P0 ⊂ P, where d is
denumerable and P is a propositional language, our interest now lies in completely
determining the composition of ∗S({w}). [Note: since our language is informal ax-
iom (3) and (4) are redundant in that superfluous parentheses have been removed.]
First, two defined sets.
A = {x | x ∈ P0 is an instance of an axiom for S} (10.1.1)
C = {x | x ∈ P0 is a finite (≥ 1) conjunction of members of d} (10.1.2)
Notice that it is also possible to refine the set C by considering C to be an
ordered conjunction with respect to the ordering of the indexing set used to index
members of d. Further, as usual, we have that A, C, d are mutually disjoint.
Theorem 10.1.1 Let w ∈ ∗Md − ∗d be an ultraword for infinite d ⊂
∗S({w}). Then ∗S({w}) = ∗A∪Q1∪d′1, where for internal *- finite d
′
1, d ⊂ d
′
1 ⊂
∗d
and internal Q1 ⊂ ∗C is composed of *-finite (≥ 1) conjunctions (i.e. i(|||and|||))
of distinct members of d′1 and w ∈ Q1. Further, each member of d
′
1 and no other
*-proposition is used to form the *-finite conjunctions in Q1, the only *-propositions
in ∗S({w}) are those in w, and ∗A, Q1 and d
′
1 are mutually disjoint.
Proof. The intent is to show that if w ∈Md − d, then S({w}) = A ∪ Q ∪ d′,
where Q ⊂ C, finite d′ ⊂ d and Q is composed of finite (≥ 1) conjunctions of
members of d′, each member of d′ is used to form these conjunctions and no other
propositions.
Let J be the set of propositional atoms in the composite w. (0) Then J ⊂
S({w}). If K is the set of all propositional atoms in S({w}), then J ⊂ K. Let
b ∈ K − J. It is obvious that b /∈ S({w}) since otherwise {w, b} ⊂ S0({w}) but
6|=S0 w → b. Thus, J = K. Consequently, J ⊂ S({w}), J ⊂ d and there does not
exists an F ∈ d − J, such that F ∈ S({w}). (1) Let J = d′. The only propositional
atoms in S({w}) are those in w. Obviously A ⊂ S({∅}).
Assume the language P0 is inductively defined from the set of atoms d. Recall
that for our axioms X = D → F , the strongest connective in X is → . While in
D, or F when applicable, the strongest connective is ∧. Since ∅ ⊂ {w}, it follows
that S({w}) = S(∅)∪S({w}). Let b ∈ S(∅). The only steps in the formal proof for b
contain axiomsor follows from modus ponens. Suppose that step Bk = b is the first
modus ponens step obtained from steps Bi, Bj, i, j < k, where Bi = A→ b, Bj = A.
The strongest connective for each axiom is → . However, since A→ b is an axiom,
the strongest connective in A is ∧. This contradicts the requirement that A must
also be an axiom with strongest connect→ . Thus no modus ponens step can occur
in a formal proof for b. Hence, (2) A = S(∅). (No modus ponens step can occur
using two axioms.)
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Let Bk = b1 ∈ P0 and suppose (a) that b1 = w, or (b) b1 6= w and is the
first nonaxiom step that appears in a formal demonstration from the hypothesis w.
Assume (b). Then all steps Bi ∈ {w} ∪ A, 0 ≤ i < k. Then the only way that
b1 can be obtained is by means of modus ponens. However, all other steps, not
including that which is w, are axioms. No modus ponens step can occur using two
axioms. Thus one of the steps used for modus ponens must not be an axiom. The
only nonaxiom that occurs prior to the step Bk is the step Bm = w. Hence, one of
the steps required for Bk must be Bm = w. The other step must be an axiom of the
form w → b1 and b1 6= w. Thus, from the definition of the axioms (3) b1 is either
a finite (≥ 1) conjunction of atoms in d′, or a single member of d′. Assume strong
induction. Hence, for n > 1, statement (3) holds for all r, 1 ≤ r ≤ n. A similar
argument shows that (3) holds for the bn+1 nonaxiom step. Thus by induction, (3)
holds for all nonaxiom steps.
Hence, there exists a Q ⊂ C such that each member of Q is composed of
finitely many (≥ 1) distinct members of d′ and the set G(Q) of all the proposition
atoms that appear in any member of Q = d′ = J since w ∈ Q. Moreover, (4)
S({w}) = A ∪ d′ ∪Q and (5) A, d′, Q are mutually disjoint.
∀x(x ∈Md − d→ ∃y∃z((y ∈ F (d)) ∧ (z ⊂ C) ∧ (S({x}) =
A ∪ y ∪ z) ∧ (A ∩ y = ∅) ∧ (A ∩ z = ∅) ∧ (x ∈ z)
(10.1.3) ∧(y ∩ z = ∅) ∧G(z) = y)).
holds in M, hence also in ∗M. So, let w be an ultraword. Then there exists
internal Q1 ⊂
∗C, w ∈ Q1 and *- finite d
′
1 ⊂
∗d such that d ⊂ ∗S({w}) =
∗A ∪ d′1 ∪ Q1;
∗A, d′1, Q1 are mutually disjoint and
∗G(Q1) = d
′
1 =
∗J. Hence,
d ⊂ d′1.
Now to analyze the objects in Q1. Let d = {Fi | i ∈ IN}. Consider a bijection
h: IN → d defined by h(n) = Fn = [f ], where f ∈ T 0 is the special member of Fn
such that f = {(0, f(0))}, f(0) = i(Fn) = qn ∈ i[d]. From the above analysis, (A)
[g] ∈ S({w})−A− d, (w ∈Md − d), iff there exist k, j ∈ IN such that k < j and
f ′1 ∈ i[P0]
2(j−k) such that [f ′1] = [g], and this leads to (B) that for each even 2p, 0 ≤
2p ≤ 2(j − k); f ′1(2p) = qk+p ∈ i[P0] ⊂ A1, [(0, qk+p)] ∈ d
′, all such qk+p being
distinct. For each odd 2p+1 such that 0 ≤ 2p+1 ≤ 2(j−k), f ′1(2p+1) = i(|||and|||).
Also (C) h(p) ∈ h[[k, j]] iff there exists an even 2p such that 0 ≤ 2p ≤ 2(j − k) and
f ′1(2p) = h(p) = qk+p ∈ i[P0]. [Note that 0 is considered to be an even number.]
By *-transfer of the above statements (A), (B) and (C), [g] ∈ Q1 iff there
exists some j, k ∈ ∗IN, k < j, and f ′ ∈ ∗(i[P0])2(j−k) such that [f ′] = [g] and
∗h[[k, j]] ⊂ ∗d. Moreover, each ∗h(r), r ∈ [k, j] is a distinct member of ∗d. The
conjunction “codes” for i(|||and|||) ∈ A1 that are generated by each odd 2p + 1
are all the same and there are *-finitely many of them. Hence, Q1 is the *-finite
(≥ 1) conjunctions of distinct members of d′1, no other *-propositions are utilized
and since ∗G(Q1) = d
′
1, all members of d
′
1 are employed for these conjunctions.
This completes the proof.
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Corollary 10.1.1.1 Let w ∈ ∗Md − ∗d be an ultraword for denumerable
d such that d ⊂ ∗S({w}). Then ∗S({w}) ∩ P0 = A ∪ Q ∪ d and A, Q, d are
mutually disjoint. The set Q is composed of finite ≥ 1 conjunctions of members of
d and all of the members of d are employed to obtain these conjunctions.
Proof. Recall that due to the finitary character of our standard objects σA =
A = ∗A ∩ P0. In like manner, since d ⊂ d′1, d
′
1 ∩ P0 = d. Now P0 ∩ Q1 are
all of the standard members of Q1. For each k ∈
∗
IN, ∗h(k) = Fk ∈
∗d and
conversely. Further, Fk ∈ d iff k ∈ IN. Restricting k, j ∈ IN in the above theorem
yields standard finite ≥ 1 conjunctions of standard members of d′1; hence, members
of d. Since ultraword w ∈ Q1, we know that there exists some η ∈ ∗IN − IN and
f ′1 ∈
∗(i[P0])
2η, where f ′1 satisfies the *-transfer of the properties listed in the
above theorem . Since finite conjunctions of standard members of d′1 are *-finite
conjunctions of members of d′1 and d = d ∩ d
′
1, it follows that all possible finite
conjunctions of members of d that are characterized by the function f ′1 ∈ i[P0]
2(j−k)
are members of Q1 for each such j, k < η. Also for such j, k the values of f
′
1 are
standard. On the other hand, any value of f ′1 is nonstandard iff it corresponds to a
member of d′1 − d. Thus Q1 ∩P0 = Q and this completes the proof.
If it is assumed that each member of d describes a Natural event (i.e. N-
event) at times indicated by Xi, dropping the Xi may still yield a denumerable
developmental paradigm without specifically generated symbols such as the “i.”
Noting that d′1 is *-finite and internal leads to the conclusion that we can have
little or no knowledge about the word-like construction of each member of d′1 − d.
These pure nonstandard objects can be considered as describing pure NSP-world
events, as will soon be demonstrated. Therefore, it is important to understand the
following interpretation scheme, where descriptions are corresponded to events.
Standard or internal NSP-world events or sets of events are inter-
preted as directly or indirectly influencing N-world events. Certain
external objects, such as the standard part operator, among others,
are also interpreted as directly or indirectly influencing N-world
events.
Notice that standard events can directly or indirectly affect standard events.
In the micro-world, the term indirect evidence or verification is a different idea than
indirect influences. You can have direct or indirect evidence of direct or indirect
influences when considered within the N-world. An indirect influence occurs when
there exists, or there is assumed to exist, a mediating “something” between two
events. Of course, indirect evidence refers to behavior that can be observed by
normally accepted human sensors as such behavior is assumed to be caused by
unobserved events. However, the evidence for pure NSP-world events that directly
or indirectly influence N-world events must be indirect evidence under the above
interpretation.
In order to formally consider NSP-world events for the formation of objective
standard reality, proceed as follows: let O be the subset of W that describes those
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Natural events that are used to obtain developmental or general paradigms and
the like. Let Ej ∈ O. Linguistically, assume that each Ej has the spacing symbol
||| immediately to the right. Thus within each Ti, there is a finite symbol string
Fi = Ei ∈ O that can be joined by the justaposition (i.e. join) operation to other
event descriptions. Assume that W1 is the set of nonempty symbol strings (with
repetitions) formed from members of O by the join operation. These finite strings
of symbols generate the basic elements for our partial sequences.
Obviously, W1 ⊂ W . Consider T′i = {XWi | X ∈ W1} and note that in many
applications the time indicator Wi need not be of significance for a given Ej in some
of the strings. Obviously, T′i ⊂ Ti for each i. For our isomorphism i onto A1, the
following hold.
∀y(y ∈ E → (y ∈ T′i ↔ ∃x∃f∃w((∅ 6= w ∈ F (i[O])) ∧ (x ∈ IN)∧
(f(0) = i[Wi]) ∧ (f ∈ P ) ∧ ∀z((z ∈ IN) ∧ (0 < z ≤ x)→
(10.1.4) f(z) ∈ w) ∧ (f ∈ y)))).
∀x(x ∈ IN→ ∃f∃w((∅ 6= w ∈ F (i[O])) ∧ (f ∈ P )∧
(10.1.5) ∀z(z ∈ IN→ (0 < z ≤ x↔ f(z) ∈ w)))).
∀w(∅ 6= w ∈ F (i[O])→ ∃x∃f∃y((f ∈ P ) ∧ (x ∈ IN) ∧ (y ∈ T′i)∧
(10.1.6) (f ∈ y) ∧ ∀z(z ∈ IN→ (0 < z ≤ x↔ f(z) ∈ w)))).
Since each finite segment of a developmental pardigm corresponds to a member
of T′i, each nonfinite hyperfinite segment should correspond to a member of
∗(T′i)−
T′i and it should be certain individual segments of such members of
∗(T′i)−T
′
i that
correspond to the ultranatural events produced by an ultraword; UN-events that
cannot be eliminated from an NSP-world developmental paradigms. [Note: For a
scientific language, 10.1.4 - 10.1.6 and other such statements correspond to a W ′ as
generated by, at least, a denumerable alphabet as used in 9.2, 9.3.]
10.2 Laws and Rules.
One of the basic requirements of human mental activity is the ability to rec-
ognize the symbolic differences between finitely long strings of symbols as necessi-
tated by our reading ability and to apply linguistic rules finitely many times. Go¨del
numberings specifically utilize such recognitions and the rules for the generation of
recursive functions must be comprehended with respect to finitely many applica-
tions. Observe that Go¨del number recognition is an “ordered” process while some
fixed intuitive order is not necessary for the application of the rules that generate
recursive functions.
In general, the simplest “rule” for ordered or unordered finite human choice, a
rule that is assumed to be humanly comprehensible by finite recognition, is to simply
list the results of our choice (assuming that they are symbolically representable in
some fashion) as a partial finite sequence for ordered choice or as a finite set of
finitely long symbol strings for an unordered choice. Hence, the end result for a
finite choice can itself be considered as an algorithm “for that choice only.” The
next application of such a finite choice rule would yield the exact same partial
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sequence or choice set. Another more general rule would be a statement which
would say that you should “choose a specific number of objects” from a fixed set
(of statements). Yet, a more general rule would be that you simply are required to
“choose a finite set of all such objects,” where the term “finite” is intuitively known.
Of course, there are numerous specifically described algorithms that will also yield
finite choice sets.
From the symbol string viewpoint, there are trivial machine programmable
algorithms that allow for the comparison of finitely long symbols with each member
of a finite set of symbol strings B that will determine whether or not a specific
symbol string is a member of B. These programs duplicate the results of human
symbol recognition. As is well-known, there has not been an algorithm described
that allows us to determine whether or not a given finite symbol string is a member
of the set of all theorems of such theories as formal Peano Arithmetic. If one accepts
Church’s Thesis, then no such algorithm will ever be described.
Define the general finite human choice relation on a set A as H0(A) = {(A, x) |
x ∈ F0(A)}, where F0 is the finite power set operator (including the empty set =
no choice is made). Obviously, the inverse H−10 is a function from F (A) onto {A}.
There are choice operators that produce sets with a specific number of elements
that can be easily defined. Let F1(A) be the set of all singleton subsets of A.
The axioms of set theory state that such a set of singleton sets exists. Define
H1(A) = {(A, x) | x ∈ F1(A)}, etc. Considering such functions as defined on
sets X that are members of a superstructure, then these relations are subsets of
P(X)× P(X) and as such are also members of the superstructure.
Let A = P0. Observe that
σH0(A) = {( ∗A, x) | x ∈ F0(A)} and ∗Hi(A) =
{( ∗A, x) | x ∈ ∗(Fi(A))} (i ≥ 0). Now ∗(F0(A)) = ∗F0( ∗A) is the set of
all *-finite subsets of ∗A. On the other hand, for the i > 0 cardinal subsets,
∗(Fi(A)) = Fi(
∗A) for each i ≥ 1. With respect to an ultraword w that generates
the general and developmental paradigms, we know that w ∈ ∗P0 −P0 and that
( ∗P0, {x}) ∈ ∗H1(P0). The actual finite choice operators are characterized by th
set-theoretic second projector operator P2 as it is defined on Hi(A). This operator
embedded by the injection θ is the same as P2 as it is defined on Hi(A). Thus,
when h = (A, x) ∈ Hi(A), then we can define x = P2(h) = Ci(h) = Ci(h). The
maps Ci and Ci, formally defined below, are the specific finite choice operators.
For consistency, we let Ci and Ci denote the appropriate finite choice operators for
Hi(A) and Hi(A), respectively.
Since the ∗P 2 defined on say Hi(A) is the same as the set-theoretic second
projection operator P2, it would be possible to denote
∗Ci as Ci on internal ob-
jects. For consistency, the notation ∗Ci for these special finite choice operators is
retained. Formally, let Ci:Hi(A)→ Fi(A). Observe that σCi = { ∗(a, b) | (a, b) ∈
Ci} = {((
∗A, b), b) | b ∈ Fi(A)} ⊂
∗Ci; and, for b ∈ Fi(A), Ci((A, b)) = b im-
plies that σ(Ci((A, b))) = { ∗a | a ∈ b} = b from the construction of E . Thus in
contradistinction to the consequence operator, for each ( ∗A, b) ∈ σHi, the image
(σCi)((
∗A, b)) = σ(Ci((A, b))) = (
∗Ci)((
∗A, b)) = b. Consequently, the set map
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σCi:
σHi → Fi(A) = σ(Fi(A)) and ∗Ci | σHi = σCi. Finally, it is not difficult to
extend these finite choice results to general internal sets.
In the proofs of such theorems as 7.2.1, finite and other choice sets are selected
due to their set-theoretic existence. The finite choice operators Ci are not specifi-
cally applied since these operators are only intended as a mathematical model for
apparently effective human processes — procedures that generate acceptable algo-
rithms. As is well-known, there are other describable rules that also lead to finite
or infinite collections of statements. Of course, with respect to a Go¨del encoding i
for the set of all words W the finite choice of readable sentences in E is one-to-one
and effectively related to a finite and, hence, recursive subset of IN.
From this discussion, the descriptions of the finite choice operators would de-
termine a subset of the set of all algorithms (“rules” written in the language W)
that allow for the selection of readable sentences. Notice that before algorithms
are applied there may be yet another set of readable sentences that yields condi-
tions that must exist prior to an application of such an algorithm and that these
application rules can be modeled by members of E .
In order to be as unbiased as possible, it has been required for N-world appli-
cations that the set of all frozen segments be infinite. Thus, within the proof of
Theorem 7.2.1, every N-world developmental, as well as a general paradigm, is a
proper subset of a *-finite NSP-world paradigm, and the *-finite paradigm is ob-
tained by application of the *-finite choice operator ∗C0. As has been shown, such
*-finite paradigms contain pure unreadable (subtle) sentences that may be inter-
preted for developmental paradigms as pure refined NSP-world behavior and for
general paradigms as specific pure NSP-world ultranatural events or objects.
Letting Γ correspond to the formal theory of Peano Arithmetic, then assuming
Church’s Thesis, there would not exist a N-world algorithm (in any human language)
that allows for the determination of whether or not a statement F in the formal
language used to express Γ is a member of Γ. By application of the *-finite choice
operator ∗C0, however, there does exist a *-finite Γ
′ such that σΓ = Γ ⊂ Γ′ and,
hence, within the NSP-world a “rule” that allows the determination of whether
or not F ∈ Γ′. If such internal processes mirror the only allowable procedures in
the NSP-world for such a “rule,” then it might be argued that we do not have an
effective NSP-world process that determines whether or not F is a member of Γ for
Γ is external.
As previously alluded to at the beginning of this section, when a Go¨del encod-
ing i is utilized with the N-world, the injection i is not a surjection. When such
Go¨del encodings are studied, it is usually assumed, without any further discussion,
that there is some human mental process that allows us to recognize that one nat-
ural number representation (whether in prime factored form or not) is or is not
distinct from another such representation. It is not an unreasonable assumption to
assume that the same effective (but external) process exists within the NSP-world.
Thus within the NSP- world there is a “process” that determines whether or not
an object is a member of ∗IN− IN = IN∞ or IN. Indeed, from the ultraproduct con-
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struction of our nonstandard model, a few differences can be detected by the human
mathematician. Consequently, this assumed NSP-world effective process would al-
low a determination of whether or not F = [fm] is a member of Γ by recalling that
fm ∈ Pm signifies that [fm] ∈ ∗Γ−Γ impliesm ∈ IN∞ ≃ ∗(i[W ])−i[W ] = ∗A1−A1.
The above NSP-world recognition process is equivalent, as defined in Theo-
rem 7.2.1, to various applications of a single (external) set-theoretic intersection.
Therefore, there are internal processes, such as ∗C0, that yield pure NSP-world
developmental paradigms and a second (external) but acceptable NSP-world ef-
fective process that produces specific N-world objects. Relative to our modeling
procedures, it can be concluded that both of these processes are intrinsic ultranat-
ural processes.
With respect to Theorem 10.1.1, the NSP-world developmental or general
paradigm generated by an ultraword is *-finite and, hence, specifically NSP- world
obtainable prior to application of ∗S through application of ∗C0 to
∗d. However,
this composition can be reversed. The NSP-world (IUN) process ∗C1 can be ap-
plied to the appropriate ∗Md type set and an appropriate ultraword w ∈ ∗Md
obtained. Composing ∗C1 with
∗S would yield d′1 in a slightly less conspicuous
manner. Obviously, different ultrawords generate different standard and nonstan-
dard developmental or general paradigms.
To complete the actual mental-type processes that lead to the proper ordered
event sequences, the above discussion for the finite choice operators is extended
to the human mental ability of ordering a finite set in terms of rational number
subscripts. New choice operators are defined that model not just the selection of
a specific set of elements that is of a fixed finite cardinality but also choosing the
elements in the required rational number ordering. The ultrawords w that exist are
*-finite in length. By application of the inverses of the f and τ functions of section
7.1, where they may be considered as extended standard functions ∗f and ∗τ, there
would be from analysis of extended theorem 7.3.2 a hyperfinite set composed of
standard or nonstandard frozen segments contained in an ultraword. Further, in
theorem 7.3.2, the chosen function f does not specifically differentiate each standard
or nonstandard frozen segment with respect to its “time” stamp subscript. There
does exist, however, another function in the *-equivalence class [g] = w that will
make this differentiation. It should not be difficult to establish that after application
of the ultralogic ∗S, there is applied an appropriate mental-like hyperfinite ordered
choice operator (an IUN-selection process) and that this would yield that various
types of event sequences. Please note that each event sequence has a beginning point
of observation. This point of observation need not indicate the actual moment when
a specific Natural system began its development.
Various subdevelopmental (or subgeneral) paradigms di are obtained by con-
sidering the actual descriptive content (i.e. events) of specific theories Γi that are
deduced from hypotheses ηi, usually, by finitary consequence operators Si (the inner
logics) that are compatible with S. In this case, di ⊂ Si(ηi). It is also possible to
include within {di} and {ηi} the assumed descriptive chaotic behavior that seems
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to have no apparent set of hypotheses except for that particular developmental
paradigm itself and no apparent deductive process except for the identity conse-
quence operator. In this way, such scientific nontheories can still be considered as a
formal theory produced by a finitary consequence operator applied to an hypothesis.
Many of these hypotheses ηi contain the so-called natural laws (or first-principles)
peculiar to the formal theories Γi and the theories language, where it is assume that
such languages are at least closed under the informal conjunction and conditional.
Consider each ηi to be a general paradigm. For the appropriate M type set
constructed from the denumerable set B = {
⋃
{di}∪ (
⋃
{ηi}), redefine MB to be the
smallest subset of P0 containing B and closed under finite (≥ 0) conjunction. (The
usual type of inductively defined MB.) Then there exist ultrawords wi ∈
∗MB−
∗B
such that ηi ⊂ ∗S({wi}) (where due to parameters usually ultranatural laws exist
in ∗S({wi}) − ηi) and di ⊂ ∗S({wi}). Using methods such as those in Theorem
7.3.4, it follows that there exists some w” ∈ ∗MB−MB such that wi ∈ ∗S({w”})
and, consequently, ηi ∪ di ⊂
∗S({w”}). Linguistically, it is hard to describe the
ultraword w”. Such a w” might be called an ultimate ultranatural hypothesis or the
ultimate building plain.
Remark. It is not required that the so-called Natural laws that appear in some
of the ηi be either cosmic time or universally applicable. They could refer only
to local first-principles. It is not assumed that those first-principles that display
themselves in our local environment are universally space-time valid.
Since the consequence operator S is compatible with each Si, it is useful to
proceed in the following manner. First, apply the IUN-process ∗S to {w”}. Then
di ∪ ηi ⊂ ∗S({w”}). It now follows that di ∪ ηi ⊂ ∗S({wi}) ⊂ ∗Si( ∗S({wi})) ⊂
∗Si(
∗Si({wi})) = ∗Si({wi}). Observe that for each a ∈ Γi there exists some finite
Fi ⊂ ηi such that a ∈ Si(Fi). However, Fi ⊂ ηi for each member of F (ηi) implies
that a ∈ ∗Si(Fi) ⊂ ∗Si( ∗S({wi})). Consequently, Γi ⊂ ∗Si( ∗S({wi})). The
ultimate ultraword suffices for the descriptive content and inner logics associated
with each theory Γi.
We now make the following observations relative to “rules” and deductive logic.
It has been said that science is a combination of empirical data, induction and
deduction, and that you can have the first two without the last. That this belief is
totally false should be self-evident since the philosophy of science requires its own
general rules for observation, induction, data collection, proper experimentation and
the like. All of these general rules require logical deduction for their application
to specific cases — the metalogic. Further, there are specific rules for linguistics
that also must be properly applied prior to scientific communication. Indeed, we
cannot even open the laboratory door — or at least describe the process — without
application of deductive logic. The concept of deductive logic as being the patterns
our “minds” follow and its use exterior to the inner logic of some theory should not
be dismissed for even the (assumed?) mental methods of human choice that occur
prior to communicating various scientific statements and descriptions.
Finally, with respect to the hypothesis rule in [9], it might be argued that we
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can easily analyze the specific composition of all significant ultrawords, as has been
previously done, and the composition of the nonstandard extension of the general
paradigm. Using this assumed analysis and an additional alphabet, onemight obtain
specific information about pure NSP-world ultranatural laws or refined behavior.
Such an argument would seem to invalidate the cautious hypothesis rule and lead
to appropriate speculation. However, such an argument would itself be invalid.
LetW1 be an infinite set of meaningful readable sentences for some description
and assume that W1 does not contain any infinite subset of readable sentences each
one of which contains a mathematically interpreted entry such as a real number or
the like. Since W1 ⊂ W and the totality Ti = {XWi | X ∈ W} is denumerable,
the subtotality T′i = {XWi | X ∈ W1} is also denumerable. Hence, the external
cardinality of ∗T′i ≥ |M|
+
.
Consider the following sentence
∀z(z ∈ i[W1]→ ∃y∃x((y ∈ A
[0,1]
1 ) ∧ (x ∈ T
′
i) ∧ (y ∈ x)∧
((0, i(Wi)) ∈ y) ∧ ((1, z) ∈ y)))). (10.2.1)
By *-transfer and letting “z” be an element in ∗(i[W1])− i[W1] it follows that
we can have little knowledge about the remaining and what must be unreadable
portions that take the “X” position. If one assumes that members of W1 are pos-
sible descriptions for possible NSP-world behavior at the time ti, then it may be
assumed that at the time ti the members of
∗T′i −Ti describe NSP-world behavior
at NSP- world (and N-world) time ti. Now as i varies over
∗
IN, pure nonstandard
subdevelopmental paradigms (with or without the time index statement Wi) ex-
ist with members in ∗T and may be considered as descriptions for time refined
NSP-world behavior, especially for a NSP-world time index i ∈ IN∞.
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11. ”Things”
11.1 Propertons (Subparticles).
What is a properton? Or, what is an infant? Or, better still, what is a thing?
I first used the name infant for these strange objects. I then coined the term
subparticle and have even used the term ”things.” These three names do not convey
the exact intuitively mean and are prone to incorrect mental images. As of 11
July 2012, the term ”properton” is employed. As discussed, they carry physical or
physical-like ”properties” in a coded form. (As stated in [9], these objects are not
to be described in terms of any geometric configuration. These multifaceted things,
these propertons, are not to be construed as either particles nor waves nor quanta
nor anything that can be represented by some fixed imagery. Propertons are to
be viewed only operationally. Propertons are only to be considered as represented
by a *-finite sequence {ai}ni=1, n ∈
∗
IN, of hyperreal numbers. Indeed, the idea of
the n-tuple (a1, a2, . . . , ai, . . .) notation is useful and we assume that n is a fixed
member of IN∞. The language of coordinates for this notation is used, where the
i’th coordinate means the i’th value of the sequence. Obviously, 0 is not a domain
member for our sequential representation.
The first coordinate a1 is a “naming” coordinate. The remaining coordinates
are used to represent various real numbers, complex numbers, vectors, and the like
physical qualities needed for different physical theories. For example, a2 = 1 might
be a counting coordinate. Then ai, 3 ≤ i ≤ 6 are hyperreal numbers that rep-
resent NSP-world coordinate locations of the properton named by a1 — a7, a8
represent the positive or negative charges that can be assigned to every properton
— a9, a11, a13 hyperreal representations for the inertial, gravitational and intrinsic
(rest) mass. For vector quantities, continue this coordinate assignment and assign
specific coordinate locations for the vector components. So as not to be biased, in-
clude as other coordinates hyperreal measures for qualities such as energy, apparent
momentum, and all other physical qualities required within theories that must be
combined in order to produce a reasonable description for N-world behavior. For
the same reason, we do not assume that such N-world properties as the uncertainty
principle hold for the NSP-world. (See note (2) on page 116.)
It is purposely assumed that the qualities represented by the coordinate ai, i ≥
3 are not inner-related, in their basic construction, by any mathematical relation
since it is such inner-relations that are assumed to mirror the N-world laws that
govern the development of not only our present universe but previous as well as
future developmental alterations. The same remarks apply to any possible and
distinctly different universes that may or not occur. Thus, for these reasons, we
view the properton as being totally characterized by such a sequence {ai} and
always proceed cautiously when any attempt is made to describe all but the most
general properton behavior. Why have we chosen to presuppose that propertons
are characterized by sequences, where the coordinates are hyperreal numbers?
For chapters 11, 12 assume EGS. Let r be a positive real number. The number r
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can be represented by a decimal-styled number, where for uniqueness, the repeated
9s case is used for all terminating decimals. From this, it is seen that there is
a sequence Si of natural numbers such that Si/10
i → r. Consequently, for any
ω ∈ IN∞ = ∗IN − IN, it follows that ± ∗Sω/10ω ∈ µ(±r), where ∗Sω ∈ ∗IN and
µ(±r) is the monad about ±r. In [9], it is assumed that each coordinate ai, i ≥ 3 is
characterized by the numerical quantity ±10−ω, ω ∈ IN∞. Obviously, we need not
confine ourselves to the number 10−ω.
Theorem 11.1.1 For each 0 < i ∈ IN, let 0 < mi ∈ IN and mi → ∞. Let
any ω, λ ∈ IN∞. Then, for each r ∈ IR, there exists a b/ ∗mω ∈ {x/ ∗mω | (x ∈
∗Z) ∧ (|x| < λ ∗mω}, where ∗mω ∈ IN∞, and b/ ∗mω ≈ r (i.e. b/ ∗mω ∈ µ(r)). If
r 6= 0, then |b| ∈ IN∞.
Proof. For r ∈ IR, there exists a unique integer n ∈ Z such that n ≤ r < n+1.
Partition [n, n+1) as follows: for each 0 < i ∈ IN, and 0 < mi ∈ IN, consider [n, n+
1/mi), . . . , [n+(mi−1)/mi, n+1). Then there exists a unique ci ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,mi−1}
such that r ∈ [n+ ci/mi, n+ (ci + 1)/mi). Let Si = (min+ ci)/mi = fi/mi. Since
0 ≤ r− Si < 1/mi and mi →∞, then Si → r. This yields two sequences S: IN→ Q
and f : IN → Z, where, for each ω ∈ IN∞, ∗Sω = ∗fω/ ∗mω ≈ r and ∗fω ∈ ∗Z.
Observe that ∗fω/
∗mω is a finite (i.e. limited) number and
∗mω ∈ IN∞. Hence,
| ∗fω/ ∗mω| < λ entails that | ∗fω| < λ ∗mω. Therefore, ∗fω/ ∗mω ∈ {x/ ∗mω | (x ∈
∗Z) ∧ (|x| < λ ∗mω}. If ∗fω ∈ Z, then ∗fω/ ∗mω ≈ 0.
Corollary 11.1.1.1 For each 0 < i ∈ IN, let 0 < mi ∈ IN and mi → ∞.
Let any ω, λ ∈ IN∞. Then, for each r ∈ IR, there is a sequence f : IN → Z such
that ∗fω/
∗mω ∈ µ(r). There are unique n ∈ Z, cω = 0 or cω ∈ IN∞ such that
cω ≤ ∗mω − 1 and ∗fω = ∗mωn+ cω.
For the ultra-properton, each coordinate ai = 1/10
ω i ≥ 3 and odd, ai =
−1/10ω i ≥ 4 and even, ω ∈ IN∞. From the above theorem, the choice of 10−ω
as the basic numerical quantity is for convenience only and is not unique accept
in its infinitesimal character. Of course, the sequences chosen to represent the
ultra-properton are pure internal objects and as such are considered to directly or
indirectly affect the N-world. Why might the *-finite “length” of such propertons
(here is where we have replaced the NSP-world entity by its corresponding sequence)
be of significance?
First, since our N-world languages are formed from a finite set of alphabets, it
is not unreasonable to assume that NSP-world “languages” are composed from a
*-finite set of alphabets. Indeed, since it should not be presupposed that there is
an upper limit to the N-world alphabets, it would follow that the basic NSP-world
set of alphabets is an infinite *-finite set. Although the interpretation method that
has been chosen does not require such a restriction to be placed upon NSP-world
alphabets, it is useful, for consistency, to assume that descriptions for substratum
processes that affect, in either a directly or indirectly detectable manner, N-world
events be so restricted. For the external NSP-world viewpoint, all such infinite *-
finite objects have a very significant common property. Note: in what follows M1
is the extended superstructure constructed on page 70.
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Theorem 11.1.2 All infinite *-finite members of our (ultralimit) model ∗M1
have the same external cardinality which is ≥ |M1|.
Proof. Hanson [8] and Zakon [16] have done all of the difficult work for this
result to hold. First, one of the results shown by Henson is that all infinite *-finite
members of our ultralimit model have the same external cardinality. Since our
model is a comprehensive enlargement, Zakon’s theorem 3.8 in [16] applies. Zakon
shows that there exists a *-finite set, A, such that |A| ≥ |M1| = |R|. Since A is
infinite, Hanson’s result now implies that all infinite *-finite members of our model
satisfy this inequality.
For an extended infinite standard set ∗A it is well-known that | ∗A| ≥ |M1|
+
.
One may use these various results and establish easily that there exist more than
enough propertons to obtain all of the cardinality statements relative to the three
substratum levels that appear in [9] even if we assume that there are a continuum
of finitely many properton qualities that are needed to create all of the N-world.
Consider the following infinite set of statements expressed in an extended al-
phabet.
GA = {An|||elementary|||particle|||k′(i′, j′)|||with|||
total|||energy|||c′+1/(n′). | ((i, j, n) ∈
IN
+ × IN+ × IN+) ∧ (1 ≤ k ≤ m)}, (11.1.1)
where IN+ is the set of all nonzero natural numbers and m ∈ IN+. Applying the
same procedure that appears in the proof of Theorem 9.3.1 and with a NSP-world
alphabet, we obtain
G′A = {An|||elementary|||particle|||k
′(i′, j′)|||with|||
total|||energy|||c′+1/(n′). | ((i, j, n) ∈
∗
IN
+ × ∗IN+ × ∗IN+) ∧ (1 ≤ k ≤ m)}, (11.1.2)
Assume that there is at least one type of elementary particle with the properties
stated in the set GA. It will be shown in the next section that within the NSP-world
there may be simple properties that lead to N-world energy being a manifestation
of mass. For c = 0, we have another internal set of descriptions that forms a subset
of G′A.
{An|||elementary|||particle|||k′(i′, j′)|||with|||
total|||energy|||c′+1/(10ζ
′
). | ((i, j, ζ) ∈
∗
IN
+ × ∗IN+ × ∗IN+) ∧ (1 ≤ k ≤ m)}, (11.1.3)
For our purposes, (11.1.3) leads immediately to the not ad hoc concept of
propertons with infinitesimal proper mass. As will be shown, such infinitesimal
proper mass can be assumed to characterize any possible zero proper mass N-world
entity. The set G′A has meaning if there exists at least one natural entity that can
possess the energy expressed by GA, where this energy is measured in some private
unit of measure.
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Human beings combine together finitely many sentences to produce compre-
hensible descriptions. Moreover, all N-world human construction requires the com-
position of objectively real N-world objects. We model the idea of finite composition
or finite combination by an N-world process. This produces a corresponding NSP-
world intrinsic ultranatural process ultrafinite composition or ultrafinite combination
that can either directly or indirectly affect the N-world, where its effect is indirectly
inferred.
Let the index j vary over a hyperfinite interval and fix the other indices. Then
the set of sentences
G′′A = {An|||elementary|||particle|||k
′(i′, j′)|||with|||
total|||energy|||c′+1/(n′). | (j ∈ ∗IN+)
(11.1.4) ∧(1 ≤ j ≤ λ)},
where λ ∈ ∗IN+, 3 ≤ i ∈ ∗IN, n ∈ IN∞ and 1 ≤ k ≤ m, forms an internal linguistic
object that can be assumed to describe a hyperfinite collection of ultranatural en-
tities. Each member of G′′A has the i’th coordinate that measures the proper mass
and is infinitesimal (with respect to NSP-world private units of measure). In the
N-world, finite combinations yield an event. Thus, with respect to such sets as G′′A,
one can say that there are such N-world events iff there are ultrafinite combinations
of NSP-world entities. And such ultrafinite combinations yield a NSP-world event
that is an ultranatural entity.
Associated with such ultrafinite combinations for the entities described in G′′A
there is a very significant procedure that yields the i’th coordinate value for the en-
tity obtained by such ultrafinite combinations. Such entities are called intermediate
propertons. Let m0 ≥ 0 be the N-world proper mass for an assumed elementary
particle denoted by k′. If m0 = 0, then let λ = 1. Otherwise, from Theorem 11.1.1,
we know that there is a λ ∈ ∗IN such that λ/(10ω) ∈ µ(m0), where ω ∈ IN∞ and
since m0 6= 0, λ ∈ IN∞. Consequently, for bn = 10−ω, the *-finite sum
(11.1.5)
λ∑
n=1
bn =
λ∑
n=1
1
10ω
=
λ
10ω
has the property that st(
∑λ
n=1 1/(10
ω)) = m0. (Note the special summation no-
tation for a constant summand.) The standard part operator st is an important
external operator that is a continuous [11] NSP-world process that yields N-world
effects. The appropriate interpretation is that
ultrafinite combinations of ultra-propertons yield an intermediate
properton that, after application of the standard part operator, has
the same effect as an elementary particle with proper mass m0.
An additional relevant idea deals with the interpretation that the *-finite set
G′′A exists at, say, nonstandard time, and that such a set is manifested at standard
time when the operator st is applied. The standard part operator is one of those
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external operators that can be indirectly detected by the presence of elementary
particles with proper mass m0.
The above discussion of the creation of intermediate propertons yields a possible
manner in which ultra-propertons are combined within the NSP-world to yield
appropriate energy or mass coordinates for the multifaceted propertons. But is
there an indication that all standard world physical qualities that are denoted by
qualitative measures begin as infinitesimals?
Consider the infinitesimal methods used to obtain such things as the charge on
a sphere, charge density and the like. In all such cases, it is assumed that charge can
be infinitesimalized. In 1972, it was shown how a classical theory for the electron,
when infinitesimalized, leads to the point charge concept of quantum field theory
and then how the *-finite many body problem produced the quasi-particle. [15]
Although this method is not the same as the more general and less ad hoc properton
approach, it does present a procedure that leads to an infinitesimal charge density
and then, in a very ad hoc manner, it is assumed that there are objects that when
*-finitely combined together entail a real charge and charge density. Further, it
is the highly successful use of the modeling methods of infinitesimal calculus over
hundreds of years that has lead to our additional presumption that all coordinates
of the basic sequential properton representation are a ± fixed infinitesimal.
In order to retain the general independence of the coordinate representation,
independent *-finite coordinate summation is allowed, recalling that such objects
are to be utilized to construct many possible universes. [This is the same idea
as *-finitely repeated simple affine or linear transformations.] Thus, distinct from
coordinatewise addition, *-finitely many such sequences can be added together by
means of a fixed coordinate operation in the following sense. Let {ai} represent
an ultra-properton. Fix the coordinate j, then the sequence {ci}, ci = ai, i 6= j
and cj = 2aj forms an intermediate properton. As will be shown, it is only after
the formation of such intermediate propertons that the customary coordinatewise
addition is allowed and this yields, after the standard part operator is applied,
representations for elementary particles. Hence, from our previous example, we
have that ultrafinite combinations of ultra-propertons yield propertons with “proper
mass” λ/(10ω) ≈ m0 while all other coordinates remain as ±10
ω. This physical-
like process is not a speculative ad hoc construct, but, rather, it is modeled after
what occurs in our observable natural world. Intuitively, this type of summation
is modeled after the process of inserting finitely many pieces of information (mail)
into a single “postal box,” where these boxes are found in rectangular arrays in post
offices throughout the world.
Now other ultra-propertons are ultrafinitely combined and yield for a specific
coordinate the ± unite charge or, if quarks exist, other N-world charges, while all
other coordinates remain fixed as ±1/(10ω), etc. Rationally, how can one conceive
of a combination of these intermediate propertons, a combination that will produce
entities that can be characterized in a standard particle or wave language?
Recall that a finite summation is a *-finite summation within the NSP-world.
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Therefore, a finite combination of intermediate propertons is an allowed internal
process. [Note that external processes are always allowed but with respect to our
interpretation procedures we always have direct or indirect knowledge relative to
application of internal processes. Only for very special and reasonable external
processes do we have direct or indirect knowledge that they have been applied.]
Let ζi ∈ µ(0), i = 1, . . . , n. Then ζ1 + · · · ζn ∈ µ(0). The final stage in properton
formation for our universe — the final stage in particle or wave substratum for-
mation — would be finite coordinatewise summation of finitely many intermediate
propertons. This presupposes that the N-world environment is characterized by
but finitely many qualities that can be numerically characterized. This produces
the following type of coordinate representation for a specific coordinate j after n
summations with n other intermediate propertons that have only infinitesimals in
the j coordinate position.
(11.1.6)
λ∑
i=1
(1/(10ω) +
n∑
i=1
ζi.
Assuming λ is one of those members of IN∞ or equal to 1 as used in (11.1.5), then
the standard part operator can now be applied to (11.1.6) and the result is the same
as st(
∑λ
i=1(1/(10
ω)).
The process outlined in (11.1.6) is then applied to finitely many distinct in-
termediate propertons – those that characterize an elementary particle. The result
is a properton each coordinate of which is infinitely close to the value of a nu-
merical characterization or an infinitesimal. When the standard part operator is
applied under the usual coordinatewise procedure, the coordinates are either the
specific real coordinatewise characterizations or zero. Therefore, N-world formation
of particles, the dense substratum field, or even gross matter may be accomplished
by a ultrafinite combination of ultra-propertons that leads to the intermediate prop-
erton; followed by finite combinations of intermediate propertons that produce the
N-world objects. Please note, however, that prior to application of the standard part
operator such propertons retain infinitesimal nonzero coordinate characterizations
in other noncharacterizing positions. (See note (1) on 116.)
We must always keep in mind the hypothesis law [9] and avoid unwarranted
speculation. We do not speculate whether or not the formed particles have point-
like or “spread out” properties within our space-time environment. These additional
concepts may be pure catalyst type statements within some standard N-world theory
and could have no significance for either the N-world or NSP-world.
With respect to field effects, the cardinality of the set of all ultra-propertons
clearly implies that there can be ultrafinite combinations of ultra-propertons “lo-
cated” at every “point” of any finite dimensional continuum. Thus the field effects
yielded by propertons may present a completely dense continuum type of pattern
within the N-world environment although from the monadic viewpoint this is not
necessarily how they “appear” within the NSP-world.
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There are many scenarios for quantum transitions if such occur in objective
reality. The simplest is a re-ultrafinite combination of the ultra-propertons present
within the different objects. However, it is also possible that this is not the case
and, depending upon the preparation or scenario, the so-called “conservation” laws
do not hold in the N-world.
As an example, the neutrino could be a complete fiction, only endorsed as a
type of catalyst to force certain laws to hold under a particular scenario. Consider
the set of sentences
GB = {An|||elementary|||particle|||k′(i′, j′)|||with|||
total|||energy|||c′+n′. | ((i, j, n) ∈
IN
+ × IN+ × IN+) ∧ (1 ≤ k ≤ m)}. (11.1.7)
It is claimed by many individuals that such objects as being described in GB
exist in objective reality. Indeed, certain well-known scenarios for a possible cos-
mology require, at least, one “particle” to be characterized by such a collection GB.
By the usual method, these statements are *- transferred to
G′B = {An|||elementary|||particle|||k
′(i′, j′)|||with|||
total|||energy|||c′+n′. | ((i, j, n) ∈
∗
IN
+ × ∗IN+ × ∗IN+) ∧ (1 ≤ k ≤ m)}. (11.1.8)
Hence, letting n ∈ IN∞ then various “infinite” NSP-world energies emerge from our
procedures. With respect to the total energy coordinate(s), ultra-propertons may
also be ultrafinitely combined to produce such possibilities. Let λ = 102ω [ resp.
λ = ω2] and ω ∈ IN∞. Then
λ∑
n=1
1
10ω
= 10ω [resp.
λ∑
n=1
1
ω
= ω] ∈ IN∞. (11.1.9)
Of course, these numerical characterizations are external to the N-world. Var-
ious distinct “infinite” qualities can exist rationally in the NSP-world without al-
tering our interpretation techniques. The behavior of the infinite hypernatural
numbers is very interesting when considered as a model for NSP-world behavior.
A transfer of finite energy, momentum and, indeed, all other N-world characteriz-
ing quantities, back and forth, between these two worlds is clearly possible without
destroying NSP-world infinite conservation concepts.
Further, observe that various intermediate propertons carrying nearstandard
coordinate values could be present at nearstandard space-time coordinates, and
application of the continuous and external standard part operator would produce
an apparent not conserved N-world effect. These concepts will be considered anew
when we discuss the Bell inequality.
Previously, ultrawords were obtained by application of certain concurrent rela-
tions. Actually, basic ultrawords exist in any elementary nonstandard superstruc-
ture model, as will now be established for the general paradigm.
Referring back to GA equation (11.1.1), for some fixed k, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, let
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hk: IN
+ × IN+ × IN+ → GA be defined as follows: hk(i, j, n) =
An|||elementary|||particle|||k′(i′, j′)|||with|||total|||energy|||c′+1/(n′). Since the set
F (IN+ × IN+ × IN+) is denumerable, there exists a bijection H: IN →
F (IN+ × IN+ × IN+). For each 1 ≤ λ ∈ IN and fixed i, n ∈ IN+, let GA(λ) =
{An|||elementary|||particle|||k′(i′, j′)|||with|||total|||energy|||c′+1/(n′). | (1 ≤ j′ ≤
λ) ∧ (j′ ∈ IN+)}. Let p ∈ IN. If |H(p)| ≥ 2, define finite M(hk[H(p)]) =
{A1|||and|||A2|||and||| · · · |||and|||Am}, where Aj ∈ hk[H(p)],m = |H(p)|. If |H(p)| ≤
1, then define M(hk[H(p)]) = ∅. Let M0 =
⋃
{M(hk[H(p)]) | p ∈ IN}. Please note
that the k′ represents the “type” or name of the elementary particle, assuming that
only finitely many different types exist, i′ is reserved for other purposes, and the j′
the number of such elementary particles of type k′.
Theorem 11.1.3 For any i, n, λ ∈ ∗IN+, such that 2 ≤ λ, there exists w ∈
∗M0 −GA, ∗GA(λ) ⊂ ∗S({w}) and if A ∈ ∗GA− ∗GA(λ), then A /∈ ∗S({w}).
Proof. Let i, j, λ ∈ IN+ and 2 ≤ λ. Then there exists some r ∈ IN such
that hk[H(r)] = GA(λ). From the construction of M
0, there exists some r′ ∈
IN such that w(r′) = An|||elementary|||particle|||k′(i′, 1′)|||with|||total|||energy|||
c′+1/(n′).|||and|||An|||elementary|||particle|||k′(i′, 2′)|||with|||total|||energy|||
c′+1/(n′).|||and||| · · · |||and|||An|||elementary|||particle|||k′(i′, λ′)|||with|||total|||
energy|||c′+1/(n′). ∈ M[hk[H(r′)]. Note that w(r′) /∈ GA, hk[H(r′)] ⊂ S({w(r′)})
and if A ∈ GA−hk[H(r)], then A /∈ S({w(r′)}). The result follows by our embedding
and *-transfer.
The ultrawords utilized to generate various propertons, whether obtained as in
Theorem 11.1.3 or by concurrent relations, are called ultramixtures due to their ap-
plications. The ultrafinite choice operatorC1 can select them, prior to application of
∗S. Moreover, application of the ultrafinite combination operator entails a specific
intermediate properton with the appropriate nearstandard coordinate characteriza-
tions. Please notice that the same type of sentence collections may be employed
to infinitesimalize all other quantities, although the sentences need not have mean-
ing for certain popular N-world theories. Simply because substitution of the word
“charge” for “energy” in the above sentences GA does not yield a particular modern
theory description, it does yield the infinitesimal charge concept prevalent in many
older classical theories.
Using such altered GA statements, one shows that there does exist ultramix-
tures wi for each intermediate properton and, thus, a single ultimate ultramixture
w such that ∗S({wi}) ⊂
∗S({w}). Each elementary particle may, thus, be assumed
to originate from w through application of the ultralogic ∗S.
Recall that if a standard A ⊂ IR is infinite, then it is external, and if B is
internal, A ⊂ B, then B 6= A. Therefore, there exists some η ∈ B such that η /∈ A.
This simple fact yields many significant nonstandard results. For example, as the
next theorem shows, if η ∈ IN∞, then there exists some λ ∈ IN∞ such that 10
2λ < η.
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Theorem 11.1.4 Let f : IN → IN and f [IN] be infinite. If η ∈ IN∞, then there
exists some λ ∈ IN∞ such that ∗f(λ) < η.
Proof. For η ∈ IN∞, consider the nonempty internal set B = { ∗f(x) | ( ∗f(x) <
η) ∧ (x ∈ ∗IN)} ⊂ ∗f [∗IN]. Let n ∈ IN. Then f(n) ∈ IN and f(n) < η imply
that (σf)[IN] = σ(f [IN]) = f [IN] ⊂ B. Since f [IN] is infinite, it is external. Thus
∗f : ∗IN → ∗IN implies that there exists some λ ∈ ∗IN such that ∗f(λ) ∈ B − f [IN].
However, ∗f is a function. Hence, λ ∈ IN∞ and
∗f(λ) < η.
Theorem 11.1.4 has many applications and can be extended to other functions
not just those with domain and codomain IN, and other B type relations.
11.2 Ultraenergetic Propertons (Subparticles).
There is a possibility that propertons can have additional and unusual proper-
ties when they are generated by statements such as GB. With respect to the trans-
lated G′B statements, we have coined the term ultraenergetic to discuss propertons
that have various infinite energies. I again note that such ultraenergetic propertons
may be considered as under the control of our previously discussed ultralogics
and ultranatural choice operators (i.e. hyperfinite choice). Further, it is possible
to place these ultraenergetic propertons into pools of infinite energy that are math-
ematically termed as “galaxies” and that have interesting mathematical properties.
However, these properties will not be discussed in this present book.
If our universe or any portion of it began or exists at this present epoch in a
state of “infinite” energy, then the ultraenergetic propertons could play a critical
role. [I point out that general developmental paradigms indicate, as will be shown,
that the actual state of affairs for any beginnings of our universe cannot be known
by the present methods of the scientific method.] Now, any such singularity that
might exist cosmologically, even in our local environment, may owe its existence to
various ultralogically generated ultraenergetic propertons. Of course, this is pure
speculation, but these NSP-world alternative explanations for assumed quantum
physical phenomena yield indirect evidence for the acceptance of the NSP-world
model.
Quantum mechanics has now become highly positivistic in character although
certain previous states of affairs have been partially accepted. This important
possibility was stated by Bernard d’Espagnet with respect to one of our preliminary
investigations — the experimental disproof of the Bell inequality and the local
variable concept [17] — that “seems to imply that in some sense all of the objects
[particles or aggregates] constitute an indivisible whole” [2]. One aspect of the
MA-model, (11.4.5) of section 11.4, can be used as an aid to model this statement.
The ideas developed within our theory of developmental paradigms do not
contradict d’Espagnet’s (weak) definition of realism. He simply requires that if
we can describe a relation between physical entities produced by some experimen-
tal process, a relation that is not observed and, thus, not described prior to the
experiment, then their must be a cause that has produced this new relation. I don’t
believe that it is necessary, under his definition, that this cause be describable.
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In May 1984, this author became aware of the Bell inequality and d’Espagnat’s
discussion of local realism [3]. In particular, we discovered that d’Espagnat may, to
some degree, embraced our the statements that appear in (11.4.5) section 11.4 as an
explanation for this experimental disproof. “Perhaps in such a world the concept of
an independent existing reality can retain some meaning, but it will be altered and
one remote from everyday experience” [4]. But is there a NSP-world cause, indeed,
a mechanism that for such behavior?
There are many scenarios as to how “instantaneous” informational signals may
be transmitted within the NSP-world without violating Einstein separability in the
N-world (i.e. no influence of any kind within the N-world can propagate faster than
the speed of light [5].) The basic N-world interpretation for any verified effect of
the Special Theory would imply that the only reason for Einstein separability is
a relation between those propertons that create the N-world and the NSEM field
propertons. But ultraenergetic propertons are not of either of these types and
need not interact with the NSEM field for many reasons. The most obvious is
that the NSEM field is not dense from the NSP-world viewpoint but is scattered.
Obviously ultraenergetic propertons may be used for this purpose. Recall that we
should be very careful when speculating about the NSP-world due to the difficulty
of describing refined behavior. However, this should not completely restrain us,
especially when the general paradigm method states that such things as these exist
logically.
It is possible to describe a mechanism and a possible new type of properton that
can send N-world instantaneous informational signals between all standard material
particles, field objects or aggregates and not violate N-world Einstein separability.
One possibility is that these influences would be imparted by means of independent
coordinate summation to the propertons that comprise these objects and yet in
doing so these new entities could not be humanly detected, not detectable except
as far as the instantaneous state change indicates, since the total energy (in this
case classical kinetic) utilized by this NSP-world mechanism would be infinitesimal.
If it is an instantaneous energy change, then, as will be shown, only that specific
energy change would appear in the N-world.
From the methods employed to construct propertons, it is immediately clear
that there exists a very “large” quantity of propertons that are not used for standard
particle and field effect construction. This can be seen by allowing the i’th symbol
is such statements as G′A to vary from 1 to some value in IN∞. The cardinality of
such collections of statements would be great than or equal to |M|+. We simply
pass this external cardinality statement to the propertons being described.
It is a basic tenet of infinitesimal reasoning that without further justification
the only properties that we should associate with such unutilized objects are of the
simplest classical type. The logic of particle physics allows us to logically accept
the existence of such propertons without any additional justification. Let λ ∈ IN∞.
Then (1/λ)4 ∈ µ(0). Let a pure NSP-world properton, not one used to construct
a universe, have mass coordinate of the value m = (1/λ)4. Call this properton P
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and have P increase its velocity over a finite NSP-time interval from zero to λ.
Propertons the attain such velocities are called ultrafast propertons.
Extending the classical idea of kinetic energy to the NSP-world it follows that
the (kinetic) energy attained by this properton, when it reaches its final velocity,
is (1/2)(1/λ)2 ∈ µ(0). Suppose that there is a continuum or less of positions within
our universe. Since c < λ, the kinetic energy used to accelerate enough of these
propertons to the λ velocity so that they could effect every position in our universe
would be less than (1/2)(1/λ) ∈ µ(0), assuming the energy is additive in the NSP-
world.
Each of these ultrafast propertons besides altering some other specific coor-
dinate would also add its total kinetic energy to the intermediate properton since
the new intermediate properton simply includes this new one. But then suppose
that our universe has existed for less than or equal to a continuum of time. Then
since 2c < λ, once again the amount of energy that would be added to our universe
over such a time period, if each of these informational propertons combined with
one member of an intermediate, would be infinitesimal. All the state alterations
give the N-world appearance of being instantaneously obtained although the exis-
tence of the G function of Theorem 7.5.1 clearly states that in the NSP-world such
alterations are actually hypercontinuous and hypersmooth.
What if the state change itself depends upon the velocity of such an ultrafast
properton? We use kinetic energy as an example. Say the change is in the kinetic
energy coordinate in the standard amount of h. Then all one needs to consider is an
ultrafast properton with infinitesimal massm = 2h(1/λ)2.Moving with a velocity of
λ, such an ultrafast properton has the requisite kinetic energy. Things can clearly be
arranged so that all other coordinates of such ultrafast propertons are infinitesimal.
Independent coordinate summation for any finite number of alterations will leave
all other nonaltered coordinates of the intermediate properton infinitely close to the
original values for the alteration is but obtained by the addition of a finite number
of new propertons to the collection.
We acknowledge that the N-world inner coordinate relations have been used
to obtain these alterations. This need not be the way it could be done. Can we
describe the method of capture and other sorts of behavior? Probably too much
has already been described in the language of this book. One should not forget that
descriptions may exist for such NSP-world behavior but not in a readable language.
The state of affairs described above lends credence to d’Espagnate’s explanation
of why the Bell inequality is violated and gives further evidence for the acceptance
of the NSP-world model. “The basic law that signals cannot travel faster than
light is demoted from a property of external [N-world] reality to a feature of mere
communicatable human experience. ....the concept of an independent or external
reality can still be retained as a possible explanation of observed regularities in
experiments. It is necessary, however, that the violation of Einstein separability be
included as a property, albeit a well-hidden and counterintuitive property....”[6]
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11.3 More on Propertons (Subparticles),
The general process for construction of all N-world fundamental entities from
propertons can be improved upon or achieved in an alternate fashion. One of the
basic assumptions of subatomic physics is that in the Natural-world two funda-
mental subatomic objects, such as two electrons, cannot be differentiated one from
another by any of its Natural-world properties. One of the conclusions of what
comes next is that in the NSP-world this need not be the case. Of course, this
can also be considered but an auxiliary result and need have no applications. At a
particular instant of (universal) time, it is possible to associate with each entity a
distinct “name” or identifier through properton construction. This is done through
application of the properton naming coordinate a1. As will be shown, the concept of
independent *-finite coordinate summation followed by n-tuple vector addition can
be accomplished by means of a simple linear transformation. However, by doing
so, the concept of the *-finite combinations or the gathering together of propertons
as a NSP-world physical-like process is suppressed. Further, a simple method to
identify each N-world entity or Natural system is not apparent. Thus, we first keep
the above two processes so as to adjoin to each entity constructed an appropriate
identifier.
A standard properton is modeled by a finite collection of numerical or coded
descriptive physical characteristics. These characteristics are represented by coordi-
nates within n-tuples. Other identifiers can also be included as specific coordinates.
Included within these propertons are those of the following special type.
Informally, consider the denumerable set all prime numbers P, a bijection
h: IN′ → P, IN′ = IN−{0}, and the sequence g: IN→ Q, the set of rational numbers,
where g(n) = 1/10n. Let ω ∈ ∗IN′ − IN′ = ∗IN − IN = IN∞. Since g → 0, n → ∞,
then ∗g(ω) = 1/10ω ∈ µ(0), the set of all infinitesimals.
Definition 11.3.1, Ultra-propertons. Let even K > 2,K ∈ IN and
f : [1,K] → {1/10ω}. Then C = {( ∗h(i), 1,−f(1), f(2), . . . ,−f(K − 1), f(K)) |
i ∈ ∗IN′}. Each member of the set C represents an ultra-properton.
For Definition 11.3.1, it is assumed that there is no more than K physical or
physical-like numerical or coded descriptive characteristics for the any elementary
entity.
Theorem 11.3.1. Consider any nonempty internal D and A ⊂ D such that |A| <
|M1|+. Then there exists a hyperfinite BA such that A ⊂ BA ⊂ D.
Proof. Let F be the finite power set operator. That is for any set X, F(X)
is the set of all finite subsets of X , where a set Y is finite if it is empty or there
exists an n ∈ IN′ = IN − {0} and a bijection f ′: [1, n] → Y. In our structure, there
is a least n ∈ IN′, such that internal D ∈ ∗Xn. If x ∈ A, then x ∈ D, x ∈ ∗Xn−1,
∗F(D) ∈ ∗Xn+2. If y ∈ ∗F(D), then y ∈ ∗Xn+1.
Consider the internal binary relation C = {(x, y) | (x ∈ y) ∧ (y ∈ ∗Xn+1) ∧
(x ∈ D) ∧ (x ∈ ∗Xn−1) ∧ (y ∈ ∗F(D))}. Let {(x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym)} ⊂ C. Then
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y′ = y1 ∪ · · · ∪ ym is an internal subset of ∗F(D). Since the domain of C is D,
A ⊂ D and |A| < |M1|+, then by saturation there exists a BA ∈ ∗F(D) such that
A ⊂ BA ∈ ∗F(D) and BA ⊂ D. This complete the proof.
Corollary 11.3.1.1 Consider any ∗E and A ⊂ ∗E such that |A| < |M1|+. Then
there exists a hyperfinite BA such that A ⊂ BA ⊂ ∗E.
Theorem 11.3.2 Consider any nonempty hyperfinite A ⊂ ∗IN′. Then there exists
a γ ∈ ∗IN such that A ⊂ [1, γ].
Proof. Every nonempty finite subset F of IN′ has a greatest member MF ∈ IN.
That is if x ∈ F, then x ∈ [1,MF ]. By *transfer, A has a *greatest member γ ∈ ∗IN
′
such that if x ∈ A, then x ∈ [1, γ]
Let r1 ∈ IR. By Theorem 11.1.1 in Herrmann (1979-93), there is a λ1 ∈ IN∞ such
that λ1/10
ω ∈ µ(|r|). Hence, st((λ1/10ω)) = |r|. Then there are K, λi, i ∈ [1,K]
that yield the K characteristics. For an elementary entity ej , some characteris-
tics can be 0, meaning that the measure has value 0. Throughout the combining
processes, if a coordinate retains its infinitesimal value ±1/10ω, this indicates that
the characteristic has no meaning for ej . In order to indicate these differences, any
characteristic that has measure 0 is obtained from a combination of two ultra-
propertons. The standard part physical realization operator St is only applied to
coordinates of the intermediate properton representations with the form ±λ/10ω,
where λ ≥ 2.
There are other characteristics such as spin, where the 0 takes on a dif-
ferent meaning. However, such coding is rather arbitrary and can be re-
placed with non-zero numbers or non-zero codings for the characteristics so
as to not confuse them with a 0 measurement. For the needed intermedi-
ate properton e1, with a third coordinate charcteristic under independent co-
ordinate addition, the set of ultra-propertons {( ∗h(i), 1,−1/10ω, . . . , 1/10ω) |
i ∈ [1, λ1]} is employed. Hence, the first intermediate properton is
(Πλ11 , λ1,−λ1/10
ω, 1/10ω, . . . , 1/10ω). For a forth coordinate intermediate proper-
ton for value r2, consider {( ∗h(i), 1,−1/10ω, λ2/10ω, . . . , 1/10ω) | i ∈ [λ1 + 1, λ1 +
λ2]}. Continue these definition for each member of [1,K]. Thus the entire collection
of ultra-propertons used to obtain one of the e1 entities is λ1+ · · ·+λK = δ1 ∈ IN∞.
It is assumed that there are a nonempty countable (i.e non-zero finite or denu-
merable) collection of {ei} needed. Thus there is a non-zero finite or denumerable
set {δi} and in the finite case, consider
∑
δi ∈ IN∞. Next consider {δi | i ∈ IN′}.
Then {δi | i ∈ IN′} ⊂ ∗IN. The |{δi | i ∈ IN′}| < |M1|+. Hence, there is a γ1 ∈ IN∞
such that {δi | i ∈ IN
′} ⊂ [1, γ1] by application of Corollary 11.3.1.1 and Theorem
11.3.2. Thus, in both cases, there is a Γ1 ∈ IN∞ such that {δi} ⊂ [1,Γ1]. This shows
that there are “enough” ultra-propertons to produce the set {ei}. For another type
of elementary particle, simply repeat this for the identifiers h(i), i > Γ1]. Then
continue by induction.
For this application, it appears unnecessary to consider more than H , where
1 ≤ H ∈ IN, different types of elementary entities. The set of ultra-propertons
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{( ∗h(i), 1,−1/10ω, . . . , 1/10ω) | i ∈ ∗IN′} = C is an internal set and as such the
hyperfinite operator ∗F is defined for it. For properton generation, a universe
can be considered as a collection of physical-systems. Hence application of a finite
iteration ∗F i to C yields
⋃
{ ∗F i(C) | (0 ≤ i ≤ n) ∧ (i ∈ IN)}, an internal collection
that is sufficient to generate the physical-systems for any of the presently considered
cosmologies. To accommodate the formation of the physical-like systems, internal
X that is disjoint from
⋃
{ ∗F i(C) | (0 ≤ i ≤ n)∧ (i ∈ IN)} is adjoined to
⋃
{ ∗F i(C) |
(0 ≤ i ≤ n) ∧ (i ∈ IN)}.
Relative to the GGU-model and generation of a universe, a hyperfinite ∗Iq(i, j)
yields a universe-wide frozen-frame. (See the appendix prior to the symbols page.)
Each instruction x ∈ ∗Iq(i, j), yields a physical or physical-like system. The
physical-systems are disjoint. Each collection of ultra-propertons that yields a
specififc physical-system is distinct from the set of ultra-propertons that yields any
other physical-system. Hence, each physical-system within a universe-wide frozen-
frame has a distinct identifier via the collection of all of the identifiers for the
ultra-propertons or the intermediate propertons employed to produce the physical-
system.
11.4 MA-Model.
In this section, we look back and gather together various observations relative
to formal theorems that yield the concept I have described as the Metaphoric-
Anamorphosis (i.e. MA) model. The different types of developmental paradigms
that can be selected by ultrafinite (i.e. ultranatural) choice and a few of our previous
results leads immediately to the following logically acceptable possibilities. [Of
course, as is the case with all mathematical modeling, simply because a possibility
exists it need not be utilized to describe an actual scenario and if it is used, then it
need not be an objectively real description.]
(11.4.1) Entire microscopic, macroscopic or large scale natural sys-
tems can apparently appear or disappear or be physically altered
suddenly.
(11.4.2) Theorem 7.3.1 shows clearly that the suddenly concept
in (11.4.1) is justifiable. Ultralogics, ultrawords, the intermediate
properton and the ultrafast properton concept are possible mecha-
nisms that can yield the behavior described in (11.4.1).
(11.4.3) All such alterations may occur in an ultracontinuous man-
ner.
(11.4.4) None of these NSP-world concepts are related to the notion
of hidden variables.
(11.4.5) Any numerical quantity associated with any elementary
particle, field effect or aggregate is associable with every numerical
quantity associated with every other elementary particle or aggre-
gate by means of hypercontinuous, hyperuniform and hypersmooth
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pure NSP-world functions. These functions may be interpreted as
representing the IUN-altering process of utilizing ultrafinite com-
position (i.e. ultranatural composition) in order to “change” any
elementary particle, field effect or aggregate into any type of ele-
mentary particle, field effect or aggregate.
Statement (11.4.5) is particular significant in that it may be coupled with ul-
tralogics and ultrafinite choice operators and entails an additional manifestation
for the possibility that there is no N-world independent existing objective reality.
Further, notice that depending upon the space-time neighborhood, state-
ments such as (11.4.1) need not be humanly verifiable (i.e. they may be
undetectable).
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(1) For propertons, only two possible intrinsic properties for elementary particle
formation are here considered. Assuming that there are such things as particles or
elementary particles, then they would be differentiated one from the other by their
intrinsic properties that are encoded within properton coordinates. When there are
particle interactions, these intrinsic properties can be altered or even changed to
extrinsic properties. How the alteration from intrinsic to extrinsic occurs probable
cannot be known since it most likely is an ultranatural event. For further results
on this subject, see http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9909078
(2) To conceive of propertons properly, quantum theory is viewed as an approx-
imation. Moreover, in terms of physically determined units, the numerical charac-
teristics produced by applications of the standard part operator are considered as
exact.
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Ultra-logic-systems
1. Logic-System Generation for Instructions
As is customary, the nonstandard model used in all of the articles on the
GGU-model is a polysaturated polyenlargements (Lobe and Wolff, 2000; Stroyan
and Bayod, 1986). In this paper, q = 1, 2, 3, 4. These numbers denote the four
primitive-time intervals (Herrmann 2006) employed for the GGU-model. The ul-
traword approach to generate a universe is replaced with an ultra-logic-system.
This is a hyperfinite logic-system where, after application of the extended logic-
system algorithm, generates each member of the hyperfinite instruction paradigm
dqx in the proper ≤dqx order such that dq ⊂ d
q
x ⊂
∗dq, where q = 1, 2, 3, 4 and
x = λ, νλ, µλ, νγλ respectively. Finally, in this article, the term ”subparticle” was
previously used. To prevent incorrect mental images as to models for subparti-
cles, the term ”properton” replaces the term ”subparticle.” Without visualizing, a
properton is an entity characterized only by a list of properties.
The primitive entity that yields physical reality for any GGU-model generated
universe is dense collection of ultra-propertons. When first conceived this author
had not investigated quantum field theory and did not base proprtins upon any
quantum theoretic approach. All of the GGU-model entities and processes can be
considered as existing in a background universe or substratum world. This
world can be considered as a physical-like world, where the rules that govern universe
formation are distinct from those processes and rules that govern the development
of any physical universe. They are simple rules that only refer to counting. This
substratum world is also interpreted philosophically in other ways.
If necessary for a specific physical theory, any continuity requirement is satis-
fied by the properton field (Herrmann, 1983, 1989). For our universe, a collection
of propertons has been shown to be closely associated with relativistic effects (Her-
rmann, 2003). No other known primitive entities, such as superstrings, will have
any effect upon the application of propertons as the primitive entities that generate
a universe. The processes used to obtain particles and all other physical entities
from ultra-propertons need not correspond to the rules of quantum field theory or
any additional rules like how quarks combine to form particles.
For our universe, quantum field theory contains descriptions (rules or instruc-
tions) that produce such particles from immaterial fields. Such fields are quantum
mechanical systems and, when represented, have various degrees of freedom. These
are but parameters that contribute to the overall state of the system. For various
particles, parameters for physical measures or states are the characterizing features
of propertons. The physical appearance and disappearance of particles are trivial
applications of properton processes. For quantum field theory, one has the “cre-
ation” and “annihilation” operators that mathematically yield the same results.
For the GGU-model, quantum theory does not produce steps in a development
since the method of production must be universe and physical law independent.
For our universe, the development “satisfies” the predictions of accepted physical
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theories. I personally consider quantum theory as mostly a product of human
imagination that predicts behavior, behavior that we cannot otherwise comprehend.
That is, it is a model that mimics.
The GGU-model can be based upon observable human behavior and the math-
ematics predicts, for our universe, behavior that satisfies the behavior predicted by
accepted physical theories. There is a vast amount of evidence for the predicted
GGU-model processes. Whether such processes exist in some sort of reality is a
philosophic choice. One can make this choice based upon various factors. One can
choose to accept properton existence based upon the same philosophy expressed
by those that accept that entities postulated in quantum field and particle theory
exist.
The concept of instructions or rules is generalized to instructions that yield a
physical reality from combinations of propertons. They are substratum laws. (So
as not to confuse these with physical laws, they are called instructions. Further, in
what follows, the events that correspond to each fq(i, j) are denoted by Eq(i, j).)
This does not mean that the rules used in quantum theory (QT) actually yield
each Eq(i, j). As mentioned, what this signifies is that the QT rules are verified via
the production of event sequences that yield our universe. For the GGU-model,
the physical realization of each fq(i, j) is not the result of any of these physical
theories. These theories are but verified by each realized fq(i, j) and they allow us
to predict what behavior occurred in or will occur within other realized fq(p, k).
For the GGU-model, the “instructions” are rather simple ones that lead to all the
characteristics that allow one to identify any material entity for any of the presently
known cosmologies.
Rather than the fq(i, j) being a general description, one considers instructions
or rules Iq(i, j) - a nonempty finite subset of L, which is equivalent to a single word in
L. These sets of instructions - instruction-sets - (also called instruction-information)
are also indexed in the same way as the general descriptions and determine the
instruction paradigm Iq. Indeed, there is an injection H on dq onto Iq, where
H(fq(i, j)) = Iq(i, j) and (i, j) varies over the same set of integers and natural
numbers. There is one instruction paradigm for each pre-designed universe and
there can be a vast collection of such universes. Rather than simply applying this
bijection as a means to reproduce each of the instruction paradigm results from
the developmental paradigm results, what follows is a duplicate of these results and
how they are obtained in terms of instruction paradigm notation.
Relative to the GGU-model and generation of a universe, a hyperfinite ∗Iq(i, j)
yields a universe-wide frozen-frame. Each instruction x ∈ ∗Iq(i, j), yields a phys-
ical or physical-like system. The physical-systems are disjoint. Each collection
of ultra-propertons that yields a specific physical-system is distinct from the set of
ultra-propertons that yields any other physical-system. Hence, each physical-system
within a universe-wide frozen-frame has a distinct identifier via the collection of all
of the identifiers for the ultra-propertons or the intermediate propertons employed
to produce the physical-system.
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2. Logic-System Generation for the Type-1 Interval.
The notation in all that follows is from Herrmann (2006). Notice that there are
two different t sequence notations. One t is in the informal world, while another t is
in the formal standard superstructure. These two sequence are, of course, consider
as equivalent since the set of objects that informally yield the informal t are also
formally present within the standard superstructure. The informal composition
fq = Iq ◦ tq, when embedded relative to E is denoted by fq = Iq ◦ tq since the tq
is not embedded relative to E and it merely generates a rational number sequence
for the embedded informal paradigm. These different notations are eliminated and
only the math-italics font is employed. This is the customary practice throughout
Herrmann (1979 - 1993). Notation for informal natural, rational and real numbers,
if applicable, is usually the same for the informal and more formal superstructure
objects. Each tq(i, j) is a rational number. Each f(i, j) is a nonempty instruction-
set.
Each member of Iq is now considered as determined by a function defined on
a set Rq of rational numbers, Q. The members of Rq carry the restricted rational
simple order and the order ≤Iq for the members of Iq (the lexicographic order) is
order isomorphic to Rq in the obvious way. Each interval partition is of the form
[ci, ci+1) (with a closed interval in two cases), where i ∈ Z and Z is the set of
integers, and tq(i, 0) = i, tq(i + 1, 0) = i + 1. Then each member of (ci, ci+1) is a
defined rational number tq(i, j), where i < j < i+ 1. For example, consider [c2, c3).
Then tq(2, 1) = 3 − 1/2, tq(2, 2) = 3 − 1/4, tq(2, 3) = 3 − 1/8, then, in general,
tq(2, j) = 3 − 1/2j. Hence, fq(2, 0) <Iq fq(2, 1) <Iq fq(2, 2) <Iq · · · <Iq f(3, 0).
(The order ≤Iq is lexicographic and is isomorphic to the rational number order for
a specific set of rational numbers.)
Let I1 be the standard instruction paradigm. An instruction paradigm is
defined mathematically in the exact same manner as that of the developmen-
tal paradigm in Herrmann (2006) and is equivalent to the range of a sequence
g′: IN → P(L), where L is our denumerable general language. The first case il-
lustrated for the GGU-model is for a developing universe starting with a frozen
segments (frame) instruction-set g′(0). For the other three GGU-model cases, this
sequence is appropriately modified. In all cases, the (fq(i, j), fq(p, k)) is equivalent
to “If fq(i, j), then fq(p, k)). This notation will be simplified later.
For the type-1 case [0, b], b > 0, as indicated above, a denumerable instruction
paradigm displays a refined form. For 1 < m ∈ IN, I1 = {f1(i, j) | (0 ≤ i ≤ m)∧(i ∈
Z) ∧ (j ∈ IN). Using I1, consider the following logic-system.
Due to the simplicity and special nature of the logic-systems used, a simpli-
fied algorithm is employed. The basic logic-system algorithm is re-defined for sets
of two distinct objects {A,B}. If a deduction yields C and C is a member of
{A,B}, then the “other” member is a deduction. Hence, if A is deduced, then
from {A,B}, B is deduced. This can be written as {A,B} − {A} is deduced. In
general, this approach is only valid for these special collections of two element
sets. This process mimics the proposition-logic modus ponens rule of inference
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{(X→ Y,X,Y) | X, Y are propositions}. However, for both logic-systems only one
member of any two element set is deducible.
Definition 2.1 Let i ∈ Z. For each n ∈ IN, let k1i (n) = {{f
1(i, j), f1(i, j + 1)} |
(0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1) ∧ (j ∈ IN)}, K1(n) =
⋃
{k1i (n) | (0 ≤ i < m) ∧ (i ∈ Z)}. Finally, let
finite Λ1(n) = {f1(0, 0)} ∪K1(n) ∪ {{f1(p− 1, n), f1(p, 0)} | (0 < p ≤ m) ∧ (p ∈ Z)}
and L1 = {Λ1(x) | x ∈ IN}. The set {{f1(p− 1, n), f1(p, 0)} | (0 < p ≤ m)∧ (p ∈ Z)}
is called the “jump elements.” Also, each Λ1(n) is a finite set.
In general, members in Lq can be characterized by a first-order sentence. When
the deduction algorithm is applied to Λ1(n) the result is an ordered set of words
from L - the ordered instruction paradigm. In accordance with the juxtaposition
join operator that yields words in L, this ordered instruction paradigm is a word in
L. It can be obtained using the spacing symbol where each member of this paradigm
is considered a sentence. For a multi-universe theory, each such universe is a portion
of each of the original members of the instruction paradigm.
In order to make the notation as simple as possible for the next construction,
notice that L1 is denumerable. Let IN − {0} = IN′. Thus, there is a bijection
D1: IN′ → L1. We use the subscript notation for this bijection. Thus, consider
L1 = {D1i | i ∈ IN
′}. For each n ∈ IN′, define M1n = {{D
1
1, . . . ,D
1
n}}. Let M
1 =
{M1n | n ∈ IN
′}. The set M1n = {{D
1
1, . . . ,D
1
n}}, as before, can be considered as a
single word-like object.
(There are a few typographic errors in Herrmann (2006) and (2006a). For
example, in Theorem 4.1, m > 0 should read m > 1, and ∗D, should read ∗D1. In
Herrmann (2006a), page 12, in the first (4), the ν ∈ ∗Z≥0 − Z should be replaced
with ν ∈ ∗Z≤0 − Z, γ ∈ ∗Z≤0 − Z should be replaced with γ ∈ ∗Z≥0 − Z.)
A finite consequence operator S is defined in Herrmann (1979 - 1993, p. 65).
However, a new simplified logic-system Sq, q = 1, 2, 3, 4 is defined. When a logic-
system is applied, it generates a specific finite consequence operator. It is the logic-
system algorithm that does this. In this article, this algorithm is explicitly noted
since only logic-systems are used. In general, logic-systems are stated in terms of
metamathematics n-tuples. If a set {A,B,C, . . . ,D} is used as an hypothesis, then
it is word-like since the objects the logical deduction models via the algorithm yields
words or word-like objects.
Define Mq, q = 2, 3, 4, in the same manner as M1, from members of Lq. For
each Gq ∈ Mq, there exists a unique n ∈ IN′ such that Gq ∈ Mqn. This G
q =
{Dq1, . . . ,D
q
n}, D
q
i ∈ L
q, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Define the logic-system that generates Sq as Sq = {{x, y} | (∃n(n ∈ IN′))∧ (x ∈
Mqn) ∧ (y ∈ L
q) ∧ (y ∈ x)}. (This definition can be further described in order to
characterize the doubleton set notion and can include all necessary bounds for the
quantifiers.) Further, under the simplification used here, each member of Sq is a
propositional tautology. Notice that Mq is a function with values a singleton set
containing an n-set (i.e. a set of “n” members).
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Usually, such a logic-system would use ordered pairs to model the rules of
inference. Within these rules, finite conjunctions are displayed as first coordinates
via n-sets. Again the simplified doubleton-set approach is used here, where one of
these sets is {{D1}, D1}.
Hypotheses are considered as members of a set (a 1-ary relation), when part
of a logic-system. They are, usually, considered as a list of the members of this set.
In general, a logic-system, when considered as an operator, is defined on subsets of
the language employed.
From the definitions employed for the logic-systems used here, the properties of
the logic-system algorithm A can be explicitly described in set-theoretic notation.
For these applications, A is a function defined on various defined logic-systems and
a set of hypotheses. For example, the entire set of deductions or the order in which
the deductions are made, among a few other characteristics. In our application to a
logic-system, the notation used signifies all of the “deduced” results the algorithm
produces when the logic-system is applied to a set of hypotheses. This yields the
same results as a corresponding finite consequence operator. What the notation
indicates is that the finite consequence operator is being displayed in a more refined
and explicit manner. Hence, the algorithm and its relation to the logic-system can
be embedded into the formal structure via formalizable characteristics.
When the application characteristics are *-transferred, then the notation ∗A
is employed. The process of applying the algorithm to the logic-system Sq, that is
applied it to a set of hypotheses Y, is denoted by A((Sq ,Y)). Hence, A is defined
upon a set of ordered pairs. The result of A((Sq ,Y)) is a set. An additional step can
be included for this specific algorithm, where Y is removed. When this is done the
algorithm is denoted byA′. The necessary informally and, hence, formally described
properties are specifically displayed. In general, the q notion is not included as part
of the A notation unless confusion would result.
For the denumerable set L1, notice that for any Λ1(k), k ∈ IN there exists
an k′ ∈ IN and X1k′ ∈ M
1
k′ , such that Λ
1(k) ∈ A′((S1, {X1k′})) and, in this case,
finite choice yields the Λ1(k) logic-system. Notice that the logic-system Λ1(k) is
considered as a set-theoretic set. Then the logic-system algorithm A is applied
to (Λ1(k), {f1(0, 0)}), where f1(0, 0) is the only hypothesis contained in the logic-
system. This yields f1(i, j) ∈ I1 as a deduction from f1(0, 0). Conversely, if f1(i, j) ∈
I1, then there is an X1k′ ∈ M
1
k′ and a logic-system Λ(k) ∈ A
′(S1, {X1k′}) such that
application of the logic-system algorithm A to (Λ1(k), {f1(0, 0)}) yields f1(i, j) as a
deduction from f1(0, 0).
The informal algorithm A is defined on any logic-system that contains an hy-
pothesis and, in this paper, such a logic-system is Λq(x) and application is on
(Λq(x),Y) where Y is an hypothesis contained in the logic-system and containing
but one member. Due to the construction of the Λq(x), this yields a partial se-
quence of members of Iq. This sequence is denoted by A[(Λq,Y)]. This sequence
represents the steps in the deduction and satisfies the ≤Iqx order. Also, for this
case, A((Λq(x),Y)) = Iqx ⊂ Iq. Significantly, for n, k ∈ IN, n ≤ k,A((Λ
1(n),Y)) ⊂
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A((Λ1(k),Y)) and A[(Λ1(k),Y)]|[1, n] = A[(Λ1(n),Y)].
In the usual way, all of the above informally defined objects are embedded rel-
ative to E . When the informal set-theoretic expresses are considered as embedded
into the standard superstructure, all of the bold font conventions defined in Her-
rmann (1979-1993) are observed. All other embedded symbols retain their math-
italics form. Where script notation is used, an underline is used in place of the
bold face font. All the following results are relative to our nonstandard model
∗M = 〈 ∗Q,∈,=〉 or ∗M = 〈 ∗IR,∈,=〉 (Herrmann, (1979 - 1993)).
Theorem 2.1 Consider primitive time interval 1 = [0, b], b > 0. It can always
be assumed that interval 1 is partitioned into two or more intervals [c0, c1), . . .
[cm−1, cm], cm = b, m > 1, m ∈ Z. Let I1 be an instruction paradigm or-
der isomorphic to the rational numbers R1 ⊂ [0, b]. For any λ ∈ IN∞, there ex-
ists a unique hyperfinite ∗Λ1(λ) ∈ ∗L1 and a λ′ ∈ ∗IN such that the ultra-
word-like X1λ′ ∈
∗M1λ′ and ultra-logic-system
∗Λ1(λ) ∈ ∗A′(( ∗S1, {X1λ′})) and
σI1 ⊂
∗A(( ∗Λ1(λ), { ∗f1(0, 0)})) = I1λ ⊂
∗I1. Also the
∗A[( ∗Λ1(λ), { ∗f1(0, 0)})]
*steps satisfy the ≤I1
λ
order and ( ∗I1 −
σI1) ∩
∗A(( ∗Λ1(λ), { ∗f1(0, 0)})) = an
infinite set.
Proof. This follows in the same manner as Theorem 4.1 in Herrmann
(2006) by *-transfer of the appropriate first-order statements that precede this
theorem statement. Also note that since for every n ∈ IN′, the Λ(n) is fi-
nite, then, via the identification process, σΛ(n) = Λ(n). It also follows that
∗Λ(n) = Λ(n) under the customary conventions. Since for any n, k ∈ IN′, n ≤ k,
A((Λ(n), {f1(0, 0)})) ⊂ A((Λ(k), {f1(0, 0)})), from the above and, via *-transfer, it
follows that
σ
I1 ⊂
∗A(( ∗Λ1(λ).{ ∗ f1(0, 0)})) = I1λ ⊂
∗I1. From the definition of
Λ1(n), these steps numbers are order isomorphic the set of rational numbers R1.
Hence, ∗A(( ∗Λ1(λ), { ∗ f1(0, 0)})) is *order isomorphic to a hyperfinite subset of
∗Q. Since there are infinitely many i < λ and i ∈ IN∞, there are infinitely many
∗f (i, j) ∈ ∗A(( ∗Λ1(λ), { ∗ f1(0, 0)})) ⊂ ∗I1, where
∗f(i, j) ∈ ∗I1 −
σI1. These
are interpreted as ultranatural events but in some cases may differ from physical
events only in their primitive time identifications. This completes the proof.
By considering the definition of L1, it follows that the given 1 < m ∈ IN, ∗Λ1(λ)
is precisely { ∗f1(0, 0)}∪{
⋃
{ ∗k1i | 0 ≤ i < m}}∪{{
∗f1(p− 1, λ), ∗ f1(p, 0)} | (0 <
p ≤ m) ∧ (p ∈ ∗Z)}. Of significance is the fact that the steps in the *-deduction
∗A(( ∗Λ1(λ), { ∗f1(0, 0)})) preserve the order ≤ ∗I
1
. Notice that ∗Λ1(λ) is obtained
by hyperfinite choice. Further, any ∗ f1(i, j) ∈ { ∗f1(x, y) | (0 ≤ x < m) ∧ (0 ≤
y ≤ λ) ∧ (x ∈ ∗Z) ∧ (y ∈ ∗IN)} ∪ { ∗f1(m, 0)} is a hyperfinite *-deduction from
f1(0, 0) = ∗f1(0, 0). And, it also follows that the set of all such *deductions yields
a hyperfinite set I1λ such that
σI1 ⊂ I
1
λ ⊂
∗I1.
For the GGU-model and each of the four cases, an internal nonempty set X
disjoint from
⋃
{ ∗F i(C) | (0 ≤ i ≤ n) ∧ (i ∈ IN)} is adjoined when info-fields are
employed. It is assumed that a physical universe is a collection of many (> 1)
physical-systems. By the way each universe-wide frozen frame is constructed, each
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∗f q(i, j) is an infinite hyperfinite set that contains for standard (i, j), the instruction-
set fq(i, j), and the set ∗f q(i, j)− fq(i, j) 6= ∅. Members of ∗ fq(i, j)− bq(i, j) can
yield the same physical-systems or members can yield physical-like systems. Each
physical-system corresponds to one member of ∗f q(i, j).
Consider each ∗fq(i, j) ∈ σIq. There is a function G
q
x(i, j):
∗fq(i, j) →
P(
⋃
{ ∗F i(C) | (0 ≤ i ≤ n) ∧ (i ∈ IN)} ∪X). The image of Gqx(i, j) is an info-field.
Each ∗y ∈ ∗f (i, j) determines the properton composition for each of the physical-
systems. For a z ∈ ∗ f(i, j) that is not equivalent to a ∗y, Gqx(i, j)(z) determines a
physical-like system relative to X.
3. Logic-System Generation for the Type-2 Interval
For the type-2 case [0,+∞), a denumerable instruction paradigm displays a
refined form. For this case, I2 = {f
2(i, j) | (0 ≤ i) ∧ (i ∈ Z) ∧ (j ∈ IN). Using I2,
consider the following logic-system.
Definition 3.1 Let 0 ≤ i ∈ Z. For each n ∈ IN, let k2i (n) = {{f
2(i, j), f1(i, j +
1)} | (0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1)∧ (j ∈ IN)}. For 0 < m ∈ Z, let K2(m,n) =
⋃
{k2i (n) | (0 ≤ i <
m)∧(i ∈ Z)}. Finally, let Λ2(m,n) = {f2(0, 0)}∪K2(m,n)∪{{f2(p−1, n), f2(p, 0)} |
(0 < p ≤ m) ∧ (p ∈ Z)} ∪ {{f2(m, j), f2(m, j + 1)} | (0 ≤ j < n) ∧ (j ∈ IN)}, and
L2 = {Λ2(x, y) | (0 ≤ x ∈ Z) ∧ (y ∈ IN)}. Notice that if 0 ≤ i < k, i, k ∈ Z,
then A((Λ2(i, j), {f2(0, 0)})) ⊂ A((Λ2(k, n), {f2(0, 0)})) for any j, n ∈ IN. Also,
each Λ2(m,n) is a finite set. (Notice that members in L2 can be characterized by a
first-order sentence.)
Consider any Λ2(q, k). Then there exists an q′k′ ∈ IN′ (q′k′ is a natural number
in IN′) and the q′k′-set X2q′k′ ∈ M
2
q′k′ , such that Λ
2(q, k) ∈ S2({X2q′k′}) and, in this
case, finite choice yields the Λ2(q, k) logic-system. Then the logic-system algorithm
A applied to (Λ2(q, k), {f2(0, 0)}) yields f2(q, k) as a deduction from f2(0, 0). Fur-
ther, f2(q, k) ∈ I2. Conversely, if f2(q, k) ∈ I2, then there exists an q′k′ ∈ IN′ and an
X2q′k′ ∈ M
2
q′k′ and a logic-system Λ(q, k) ∈ A
′((S2, {X2q′k′})) such that application
of the logic-system algorithmA to (Λ2(q, k), {f2(0, 0)}) yields a deduction of f2(q, k)
from f2(0, 0).
Theorem 3.1 Consider primitive time interval 2 = [0,+∞). It can always be
assumed that interval 2 is partitioned into intervals [c0, c1), . . . [cm−1, cm), m >
1, m ∈ Z. Let d2 be an instruction paradigm order isomorphic to the rational
numbers R2 ⊂ [0,+∞). For any λ ∈ IN∞ and ν ∈ ∗Z − Z, ν > 0, there exists a
unique hyperfinite ∗Λ2(ν, λ) ∈ ∗L2 and ν′, λ′ ∈ ∗IN such that the ultra-word-like
X2ν′λ′ ∈
∗M2ν′λ′ and ultra-logic-system
∗Λ2(ν, λ) ∈ ∗A′(( ∗S2, {X2ν′λ′})) and
σI2 ⊂
∗A(( ∗Λ2(ν, λ), { ∗f2(0, 0)})) = I2νλ ⊂
∗I2. Also the
∗A[( ∗Λ2(ν, λ), { ∗ f2(0, 0)}))]
*steps satisfy the ≤I2
νλ
order and ( ∗I2 −
σI2) ∩
∗A( ∗Λ2(ν, λ), { ∗ f2(0, 0)})) = an
infinite set.
Proof. As in Theorem 2.1, the proof follows by *-transfer of the appropriate
formally presented material that appears above in this section 3.
By considering the definition of L2, it follows that the ∗Λ2(ν, λ) is precisely
{ ∗f2(0, 0)}∪{
⋃
{ ∗k2i | 0 ≤ i < ν}}∪{({
∗ f2(p−1, λ), ∗f2(p, 0)} | (0 < p ≤ ν)∧(p ∈
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∗Z)} ∪ {{ ∗f2(ν, j), ∗f2(ν, j + 1)} | (0 ≤ j < λ) ∧ (j ∈ ∗IN)}. Of significance is the
fact that the steps in the *-deduction ∗A[ ∗Λ2(ν, λ), { ∗f2(0, 0)}))] preserve the
order ≤ ∗I
2
. Notice that ∗Λ2(ν, λ) is obtained by hyperfinite choice. Further, any
∗f2(i, j) ∈ { ∗ f2(x, y) | (0 ≤ x ≤ ν) ∧ (0 ≤ y ≤ λ) ∧ (x ∈ ∗Z) ∧ (y ∈ ∗IN)} is a
hyperfinite *-deduction from f2(0, 0). And, it also follows that the set of all such
*deductions yield a hyperfinite set I2νλ such that
σI2 ⊂ I
2
νλ ⊂
∗I2.
4. Logic-System Generation for the Type-3 Interval
For the type-3 case (−∞, 0], a denumerable instruction paradigm displays a
refined form. For this case, d3 = {f3(i, j) | (i ≤ 0) ∧ (i ∈ Z) ∧ (j ∈ IN). Using d3,
consider the following logic-system.
Definition 4.1 Let i ∈ Z, i ≤ 0. For each n ∈ IN, let k3i (n) = {{f
2(i, j), f1(i, j+
1)} | (0 ≤ j ≤ n − 1) ∧ (j ∈ IN)}. For m ∈ Zm < 0, let K3(m,n) =
⋃
{k3i (n) |
(m ≤ i < 0) ∧ (i ∈ Z)}. Finally, let Λ3(m,n) = {f3(m, 0)} ∪ K3(m,n) ∪ {{f3(p −
1, n), f3(p, 0)} | (m < p ≤ 0) ∧ (p ∈ Z)}, and L3 = {Λ2(x, y) | (0 ≤ x ∈ Z) ∧
(y ∈ IN)}. Notice that if i < k ≤ 0, i, k ∈ Z, then A((Λ3(i, j)), {f3(m, 0)})) ⊂
A((Λ3(k, n), {F3(m, 0)})) for any j, n ∈ IN. Also, each Λ3(m,n) is a finite set.
(Notice that members in L3 can be characterized by a first-order sentence.)
Consider any Λ3(q, k). Then there exists an q′k′ ∈ IN and X3q′k′ ∈ M
3
q′k′ , such
that Λ3(q, k) ∈ A′((S3, {X3q′k′})) and, in this case, finite choice yields the Λ
3(q, k)
logic-system. Then the logic-system algorithm A applied to (Λ3(q, k), {f3(q, 0)}))
yields f3(q, k) as a deduction from f3(q, 0). Further, f3(q, k) ∈ I3. Conversely, if
f3(q, k) ∈ I3, then there is an X3q′k′ ∈ M
3
q′k′ and a logic-system Λ(q, k) ∈ S
3({X3q′k′})
such that application of the logic-system algorithm A to (Λ3(q, k), { ∗f3(q, 0)}))
yields f3(q, k) as a deduction from f3(q, 0).
Theorem 4.1 Consider primitive time interval 3 = (−∞, 0]. It can always be
assumed that interval 3 is partitioned into intervals . . . , [c−2, c−1), [c−1, c0]. Let d3
be an instruction paradigm order isomorphic to the rational numbers R3 ⊂ (−∞, 0].
For any λ ∈ IN∞, µ ∈ ∗Z−Z, µ < 0, there exists a unique hyperfinite ∗Λ3(µ, λ) ∈
∗L3 and µ′, λ′ ∈ ∗IN such that the ultra-word-like X3µ′λ′ ∈
∗M3µ′λ′ and ultra-logic-
system ∗Λ3(µ, λ) ∈ ∗A′(( ∗S3, {X3µ′λ′})) and
σI3 ⊂
∗A( ∗Λ3(µ, λ), { ∗ f3(µ, 0)})) =
I3µλ ⊂
∗I3. Also the
∗A[( ∗Λ3(µ, λ), { ∗f3(µ, 0)}))] *steps satisfy the ≤I3
µλ
order
and ( ∗I3−
I
3) ∩ ∗A(( ∗Λ3(µ, λ)), { ∗ f3(µ, 0)})) = an infinite set.
Proof. As in Theorem 3.1, the proof follows by *-transfer of the appropriate
formally presented material that appears above in this section 3.
By considering the definition of L3, it follows that the ∗Λ3(µ, λ) is precisely
{ ∗f3(µ, 0)} ∪ {
⋃
{ ∗k3i | µ ≤ i < 0}} ∪ {{
∗ f3(p − 1, λ), ∗ f2(p, 0)} | (µ < p ≤
0) ∧ (p ∈ ∗Z)}. Of significance is the fact that the steps in the *-deduction
∗A[( ∗Λ3(µ, λ), { ∗f3(µ, 0)}] preserve the order ≤ ∗I
3
. Notice that ∗Λ3(µ, λ) is
obtained by hyperfinite choice. Further, any ∗f3(i, j) ∈ { ∗f3(x, y) | (µ ≤ x <
0) ∧ (0 ≤ y ≤ λ)} ∪ {f3(0, 0} is a hyperfinite *-deduction from f3(µ, 0). And, it
also follows that the set of all such *deductions is a hyperfinite set I3νλ such that
σI3 ⊂ I
3
νλ ⊂
∗I3.
The Theory Ultralogics 125
5. Logic-System Generation for the Type-4 Interval
Theorem 5.1 Consider primitive time interval 4 = (−∞,+∞). It can always
be assumed that interval 4 is partitioned into intervals . . . , [c−2, c−1), [c−1, c0), . . ..
Let d4 be a instruction paradigm order isomorphic to the rational numbers R4 ⊂
(−∞,+∞). For any λ ∈ IN∞, ν, γ ∈ ∗Z − Z, such that ν ≤ 0, γ ≥ 0,
there exists a unique hyperfinite ∗Λ4(ν, γ, λ) ∈ ∗L4 and ν′, γ′, λ′ ∈ ∗IN such
that the ultra-word-like X4ν′γ′λ′ ∈
∗M4ν′γ′λ′ and ultra-logic-system
∗Λ4(ν, γ, λ) ∈
∗A′(( ∗S4, {X4ν′γ′λ′})) and
σI4 ⊂
∗A(( ∗Λ4(ν, γ, λ), { ∗ f4(ν, 0)})) = I4νγλ ⊂
∗I4. Also the
∗A[( ∗Λ4(ν, γ, λ), { ∗ f4(ν, 0)})] *steps satisfy the ≤I4
νγλ
order and
( ∗I4 −
σI4) ∩
∗A(( ∗Λ4(ν, γ, λ), { ∗ f4(ν, 0)})) = an infinite set.
By considering the definition of L4, it follows that the ∗Λ4(ν, γ, λ) is precisely
{ ∗f4(ν, 0)}∪{
⋃
{ ∗k4i | (ν ≤ i < γ)∧ (i ∈
∗Z)}}∪{{ ∗f4(p−1, λ), ∗f4(p, 0)} | (ν <
p ≤ γ)∧ (p ∈ ∗Z)}∪{{ ∗f4(γ, j), ∗ f4(γ, j+1)} | (0 ≤ j < λ)∧ (j ∈ ∗IN)}. Of signif-
icance is the fact that the steps in the *-deduction ∗A[( ∗Λ4(ν, γ, λ), { ∗f4(ν, 0)})]
preserve the order ≤ ∗I
4
. Notice that ∗Λ4(ν, γ, λ) is obtained by hyperfinite choice.
Further, any ∗f4(i, j) ∈ { ∗f4(x, y) | (ν ≤ x ≤ γ) ∧ (0 ≤ y ≤ λ)} is a hyperfinite
*-deduction from f4(ν, 0). And, it also follows that the set of all such *deductions
is a hyperfinite set I4νγλ such that
σI4 ⊂ I
4
νγλ ⊂
∗I4.
The above established theorems and appropriate definitions all hold for the
development paradigms and yield ultra-logic-systems that can replace the ultralogic
notion.
6. The Complete GGU-model Scheme
For the (StGq) is defined in Herrmann (2006a). The following scheme is not in
composition notational form due to one application of choice and the step-by-step
application of (StGq). It represents an ordered application of the GGU-model op-
erators. For q = 1, 2, 3, 4, x = λ, νλ, µλ, νγλ with or without commas, respectively.
The a, b, c take the appropriate value for a specific q.
(StGq)(
∗A(( ∗Λq(a), { ∗ fq(b, c)})))( ∗A′(( ∗Sq, {Xqa′}))).
The operators A and A′ have characterizing first-order statements. These
statements need not capture all of of the intuitive statements that describe the
algorithms. T he results of application of A′ as formalized can show major aspects
of the algorithm’s selection process. For example,
∀x∀y∀z∀w((w ∈Mq) ∧ (y ∈ F(Lq)) ∧ (y ∈ w) ∧ (x ∈ A′((Sq, y))→
∃p((p ∈ Sq) ∧ (y ∈ p) ∧ (x ∈ p) ∧ (y 6= x)).
Of course, the natural numbers and the embedded Dq can also be employed.
7. The Participator Universe.
For the GGU-model, one of the most difficult requirements is to include the
concept of the “participator” universe. As stated at the May 1974 Oxford Sympo-
sium in Quantum Gravity, Patton and Wheeler describe how existence of human
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beings alter the universe to various degrees. “To that degree the future of the uni-
verse is changed. We change it. We have to cross out that old term ‘observed’
and replace it with the new term ‘participator.’ In some strange sense the quan-
tum principle tells us that we are dealing with a participator universe.” (Patton
and Wheeler (1975, p. 562).) This aspect of the GGU-model is only descriptively
displayed in section 4.8 in Herrmann (2002). It is now possible to obtain formally
the collection of pre-designed universes that satisfies this participator requirement.
The previous notation is modified for finitely many (> 0) instruction paradigms
as previously denoted by Iq. From the construction of each instruction paradigm
using L, it follows that there is, at least, a sequence of possible alterations. An
instruction paradigm is a nonempty subset of the subsets of L. Hence, the collection
of all such instruction paradigms is a member of P(P(L)). There can be infinitely
many basic universes. These are universes prior to participator alterations. For each
of these, there is an collection of ultra-word-like objects of the appropriate type.
What follows next is for an arbitrary member of this collection of ultra-world-like
objects and, hence, an arbitrary basic universe.
So as to include the type of universe being considered, let q: IN′ × [1, 4] →
P(P(L)). Then for a specific p ∈ [1, 4] an expression {x | (x = q(n, p)) ∧ (n ∈
IN
′)} = Ip represents this denumerable set of instruction paradigms for type-p
universes. (If n′ 6= m, then q(n′, p) 6= q(m, p).) Let {x | ∃p(p ∈ [1, 4] ∧ (x = Ip)} =
I. Then, a specific f1(0, 0) is further identified relative to the sequences. As an
example, fq(3,1)(0, 0) ⊂ L represents a specific n = 3 type-1 instruction-set. Thus,
as embedded into the formal structure this last expression reads fq(3,1)(0, 0) ⊂ L.
An original alteration can be miniscule and made in one or more of the neces-
sary parameters that are satisfied by a specific cosmology. This can be done in such
a way that only miniscule alterations in physical-system satisfy the alterations. On
the other hand, a highly altered cosmology can also occur. An alteration is local
prior to it being propagated during a universe’s development. Although not specif-
ically included, and indeed the definition would need to be altered slightly, other
sequences q′ can be used where various values can be empty or repeated. Also, for a
universe with infinitely many local alterations at the same moment, one can include
the obvious change in the q sequence, where the sequence q is a sequence of type-4
except that each image is a “universe.”
For the GGU-model, the various members of Ip satisfy the “participator” re-
quirements, when participators exist, for each of the known suggested cosmologies.
When embedded into the formal structure, properties of q can be easily character-
ized, using various forms, in a first order language. For example,
∀x∀p((x ∈ IN′) ∧ (p ∈ [1, 4])→
∃y∃z((z ∈ I) ∧ (y ∈ z) ∧ (q(x, p) = y)).
Consider a specific p′ ∈ [1, 4]. Then
∀y((y ∈ Ip′))→ ∃x((x ∈ IN
′) ∧ (q(x, p′) = y)).
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In *-transfer form, these two sentences read
∀x∀p((x ∈ ∗IN′) ∧ (p ∈ [1, 4])→
∃y∃z((z ∈ ∗I) ∧ (y ∈ z) ∧ ( ∗q(x, p) = y)).
∀y((y ∈ ∗Ip′))→ ∃x((x ∈
∗
IN
′) ∧ ( ∗q(x, p′) = y)).
The previous four theorems are all relative to a specific instruction paradigm
and each holds for a collection of these instruction paradigms. Thus, the notion can
be added and the additional statement that the results hold for each n ∈ ∗IN′ and
each p ∈ [1, 4]. The special processes noted in the scheme in section 6 are applied
to each set of instruction paradigms.
Each member of In Herrmann (2002), hyperfast propertons are mentioned as
mediators for the automatic selection of a particlar member of Ip. Each not realized
member of {I}p is termed as covirtual. Notice that from the transformed formal
statements above, there exist a member of Ip′ for each γ ∈
∗
IN
′ − IN′. These can be
used for various interpretations using either a q, q′, q type of sequence. Further,
GGU-model predicted processes and entities can aid in comprehening the notion of
the non-temporal and its relation to the temporal.
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